Yayin Tarihi:17 Mart/March 1998
TURKEY'S PLACE IN THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE
An Updated Assessment
By
Mehmet ÖGÜTÇÜ
Jean Monnet Fellow
October 1992 Bruges & Paris
Continued from part IV - published on 23 January 1998
2- FACTORS AFFECTING THE TURCO-COMMUNITY RELATIONS
a) Economic Fitness. This is the number one issue. The EC, with its 345
mn population and an average $ 14.000 per capita income, forms the core of the greater
European market of 500 mn people. Turkey, an associate member of the Community since 1963,
will take a bigger step along the road in January 1996, if things go right, since that is
when it is due to move into a full customs union with the Community; but this presupposes
Turkey's ability to remove the various charges it still imposes on imports from the EC,
and the EC's willingness to drop the textile quotas it still, largely on Portugal's
insistence, imposes on Turkey. In any event, customs union will still exclude most Turkish
farm products. It is also unlikely to bring free movement of labour in the 1990s. Nor will
it bring Turkey inside the complicated machinery of the Single Market and the EMU; the
Turks will just have to adapt themselves to the Single Market's rules. Before the
realization of the full membership goal, there are many things the Turks have to do. Over
the past four decades, the Turks have been trying hard to combine rapid industrialisation
with improvements in living standards for its young population. The growth rate of the
economy has been over 6 percent for the last five years. Manufacturing has long overtaken
farming in the Turkish economy. Four fifths of Turkish exports are of industrial products,
while agricultural goods are less than one fifth. Turkey's export profile is surprisingly
diversified, ranging from cars and buses to ceramics, carpets, textiles and
pharmaceuticals. Confidence in Turkish economy has noticeably grown in general.
During the last five years, enterprises of the EC have invested the lion's share in Turkey - from $ 80 mn in 1980 to $ 1.25 bn in 1990. The Community's share of foreign investment rose by half as much from 46.5 % to 70 %. These figures indicate a healthy trend rather than a passing phenomenon. Turkey has a modern network of communications and transportation facilities, coupled with organized industrial zones, due to the priority given to energy, telecommunications and transport infrastructure projects in the 1980s. In addition, Turkey offers a mechanism for foreign participation in turnkey projects. Created in 1984 and known as the "BOT" (build, operate, transfer) formula, it allows foreign firms to directly invest in large-scale infrastructure projects such as dams, airports, power stations, auto-routes and railways. Last year, there were nearly 2000 foreign companies in Turkish market with the EC companies operating principally in agriculture and forestry, textiles and leather, metal goods, machineries, electronics, chemicals and fertilisers as well as in banking and trading. Turkish investments in the EC countries are also on the increase. An interesting development is that in Germany alone there are 33.000 small or medium-size Turkish enterprises with a total turnover of DM 30 bn, employing a total of 105.000 people. The investments of the Turkish companies in Germany are about DM 6 bn - a figure several times higher than total German investments in Turkey. Turkish banks continue to acquire shares in some European banks in preparation for the 1992 project. And the leading business and industrial holdings have established their presence in all the major European capitals.
The EC is very important for Turkey's foreign trade. In 1990, 53.2 % of Turkish exports went to the EC markets and imports from the EC countries amounted to 41.8 % of total imports. The volume of trade was $ 4 bn in 1980 while in 1990 it reached $ 16 bn. However, the Turkish trade deficit with the EC has widened from $ 647 mn in 1989 to $ 2.45 bn in 1990, an increase of 270 % in only one year. This deficit is expected to further increase in 1992. As an exporter to the EC it was in 48th position in 1980, and in 18th in 1990, while as a market for the Community exporters it rose during that period from 27th to 12th. Germany tops the list in the EC as Turkey's biggest trade partner, absorbing nearly a fifth (18.7 %) of Turkey's total imports in 1989. By much the same token, 14 % of Turkey's imports come from Germany. Ankara is pressing for a balanced trade situation to result from its negotiations with Brussels. The Turkish government has adopted certain measures in the overall context of bringing its trade policy more into line with the rules arising from the Association. In this respect, Turkey's reduction of customs duties and alignment to the Common Customs Tariff vis-a-vis the Community has been realized according to the schedule that was agreed upon in 1988. This accelerated calendar of tariff dismantlements and alignments has been regularly implemented until the present- day. The consolidated liberalization ratio regarding Turkish imports from the EC has reached 80 percent, thereby marking the irreversibility of free and unhindered trade between Turkey and the Community.
Some economists are inclined to compare Turkey with the star performer in the EC: Spain. The average annual economic growth rate of Turkey over the past ten years has been about the double of the Community average and much higher than that of all the new members. Based on fixed prices and exchange rates, the Turkish GNP growth rate from 1980 to 1989 reached 54.2 % while the same rate was 40.6 % for Spain, 25.5 % for Portugal and 15.4 % for Greece. According to the OECD figures based on purchasing power parities, Turkish GNP amounted to $ 247.6 bn in 1989 as this figure stood at $ 401.9 bn for Spain, $ 72.1 bn for Portugal and $ 72.4 bn for Greece. Similar comparisons are also made in relation to gross fixed capital investments. Such investments in Turkey reached $ 12.19 bn, almost equal to the total investments of Portugal and Greece combined. In energy production, Turkey reached a level of 28.20 million tons oil value in 1988. The same year Spain slightly exceeded the Turkish production with 30.5 mn tons while the Greek and Portuguese productions remained at 8.65 mn and 3.99 mn tons respectively. The Turkish exports totalled approximately $ 20 bn in 1989 representing a six-fold increase since 1975. In 1980 Turkish exports were about half that of Greece whereas it is today more than double.
Despite impressive performance displayed by Turkish economy since 1980, its current
economic situation does not convince that the adjustment problems which would confront
Turkey if it were to accede to the EC could be readily overcome in the foreseeable future.
There is still a major development gap. A comparison of GDP per head reveals that
purchasing power parity in Turkey is one third of the Community average. This gap does not
seem likely to be reduced rapidly, given the rapid population growth (2,5 % annually) and
in spite of efforts to slow it down. As long as these disparities continue to exist, there
will be reason to fear that Turkey would experience serious difficulties in taking on the
obligations resulting from the EC's economic and social policies. Also, the additional
budget burden, the access of Turkish labour to the Community and the competition coming
from Turkey's agricultural and textile products give rise to fears in the Community.
It is clear that Turkey has a comparative advantage in global terms with regard to agricultural production. If the Community were enlarged to include Turkey, the consequen- ces would be that the useable agricultural area of the EC would increase by 22 %, the number of farms would increase by 41 % and the agricultural workforce would almost double. As in most newly-industrialising economies, the once dominating role of agriculture in Turkey is gradually being eroded. While in 1962 agriculture's share in GDP reached 34.8 percent, it had shrunk to 16 percent in 1988. Notwithstanding the fact that a high proportion of Turkey's workforce is employed in agriculture, the rapid rate of urbanization and industrialization is causing a shift away from such concentration. Turkey enjoys a geo-climatic diversity which permits the production of a wide range of agricultural goods including both northern and Mediterranean type products. Its agricultural land is 37 percent of the Community total. This extensive land is, however, not being cultivated efficiently: labour productivity and physical yields remain below the Community norms. Apart from its position as a self-sufficient country in food, Turkey has been, and remains, a net exporter of agricultural goods. While in 1978 the export of agricultural goods accounted for % 67.4 of its total exports, ten years later the share had declined to less than 20 percent versus 80 percent for industrial products. Participation in the CAP will have a great bearing on the Turkish economy given the sizeable share of agriculture in total employment and in national income. Turkey can no doubt expect to profit from the CAP.
In considering the prospect of Turkey's adapting to the CAP, it would be well to begin by
asking what lies behind the respective agricultural policies. Turkey has to feed a
population of 60 million which is increasing by 2 % p.a. By contrast, the Community's
population is stagnant and mountains of various surplus products are increasing in spite
of highly subsidised exports. There would thus be a deep-seated divergence of interests.
Whilst we would expect the Community to move towards containing and curtailing production
in certain sectors, Turkey would want to increase production almost across the board.
There is, however, no automatic reason that Turkey should place unreasonable demands on
the budget to implement the CAP. On more specifically agricultural issues, there will be
opportunities for existing members as well as threats (a fairly large drain on Community
funds for export rebates on Turkish agricultural exports to third countries) from Turkey's
accession. Community customers will benefit from a wider range of products on offer to
them. Its geographic position and range of agro-climatic zones will add further diversity
to the Community widening the supply base for fresh products. These benefits will only be
achieved if members are prepared to allow agriculture to share in the process of the
creation of the Single Market. This is far from assured yet. Thus it is more likely that
Turkey's contribution will be in terms of specific products, qualities or timing of sales.
Many members will regard the enormous and rapidly developing Turkish market as a
destination for their exports. With fast income growth and a relatively backward livestock
sector, Turkey may provide good opportunities to EC exporters of dairy products, beef and
poultry meat eggs. Turkey will occupy an extremely important position in the agricultural
economy of the EC. The gross value of agricultural output, were she to join in 1988, was
calculated to be $ 20.2 bn.
In referring to the Turkish agriculture, one should not pass without mentioning the gigantic G.A.P., the Turkish acronym for the South-East Anatolia Project, the largest regional development project to be implemented in Turkey with an approximate total cost of $ 23 bn. It is currently among the major development projects of the world in terms of its magnitude and objectives, evolving around 13 irrigation and energy projects to be built on the Firat (Euphrates) and Dicle (Tigris) rivers. The project includes the construction of 22 dams and 17 hydro-electric power plants. Two underground channels eight meters across will irrigate an area between the Tigris and the Euphrates roughly equivalent in size to that of the Benelux countries. Already climatic changes have followed the creation of new lakes and reservoirs. Upon its completion, over 1,5 mn hectares land will be irrigated and 34,780 Gwh hydro-electric power will be generated. The GAP project is expected to make a profound contribution to the economy of Turkey's less developed regions. Agricultural production will be boosted by the irrigation projects (according to some projections, once GAP is fully developed, Turkey's agricultural capacity will be doubled by the year 2000) and industry will benefit from abundant and inexpensive energy sources. Turkey's relatively water-poor Arab neighbours are concerned that the vast plan will further diminish their lifeblood. Yet GAP has its Turkish critics too. Since the foundation stones were laid in 1981, the GAP has absorbed $ 9.3 bn. By 2005 Turkey is set to spend a further $ 23 bn while another $ 10 bn will be needed to complete the project sometime in the next century. Many economists believe it has been the single largest factor behind Turkey's 70 percent rate of inflation. Because of the strong international passions the project has aroused, particularly in the Arab world, the financing has had to come, not from big international lenders like the World Bank, but largely out of Turkey's own budgetary means - every year GAP absorbs 10 percent of total government outlays, which does not include the subsidies and investment incentives given to private business to move to the area. The Turks presume that the Community's intervention and especially its financial support (EAGF, ERDF and EIB) would be helpful in easing the burden of regional policy on the national budget.
One of the main requirements for adhesion to the EC is certainly the achievement of macro economic stability which is characterised by external and internal balance. On the external side, the Turkish economy has undergone dramatic changes in the 1980s. The more outward-looking approach adopted by the government and the ensuing trade liberalization programme allowed Turkey to overcome its long history of balance of payments difficulties. For the last few years, the balance of payments have even registered a surplus with the help of growing exports and invisible transfers such as tourism revenues and workers remittances. Internal stability is, however, far from being achieved. After a brief period of comparatively low inflation during the mid-eighties, inflationary pressures have again gained momentum. At the end of 1991, the rate of inflation stood at 65 percent and is still showing an upward trend despite the commitment of the government to reduce it to a manageable level by 1993. The main reasons for such excessive inflation rate are the large scale infrastructure investments and the operating costs of the State Economic Enterprises, which also account for the public deficit.
The EC's representative in Turkey, Mr. Michael Lake, lists the EC's expec- tations from Ankara by saying that much more should be done to achieve a level of economic development comparable to that of its European partners by combatting high inflation, improving general living standards and thus expanding the domestic market; properly protecting patent, trade marks and intellectual property; ending remaining discriminatory practices in banking, oil and pharmaceuticals; and by enhancing both regional and political stability. The member states of the EC have been traditional investors in Turkey. Lake advises the EC investors that they should now perceive Turkey as the "center of a newly democratising, secular region stretching from Yugoslavia and Hungary to China".
Turkey's drive towards integration with Europe has gained a new strength with the signing on 17 October 1991 of a free trade agreement with the EFTA countries - the first in a series of similar agreements signed with Central & Eastern European countries as well - which covers industrial goods including fish and processed agricultural products. It was scheduled to be operational by April 1992, but the national ratifications in EFTA countries could be completed only on 2 July 1992. This agreement, currently in effect, is seen as the logical result of the increasing trade flow between Turkey and EFTA, totalled $ 1.8 bn in 1990 (EFTA imports from Turkey $ 584 mn and exports $ 1.263 mn). By the end of the transition period in 1995, Turkey will progressively have abolished its tariffs on import from these countries. As a result of the Agreement, Turkish-EFTA trade will be put on the same preferential basis as trade between Turkey and the EC. In the overall trade, Turkey registered a big deficit - imports from EFTA rose to 1.2 bn dollars while exports remained at 600 mn dollars. The agreement concentrates on the progressive, but asymmetrical, liberalization of trade in industrial goods. By way of an evolutionary clause the scope can however be extended to other fields, e.g. services, direct investments and etc. Agricultural trade is to be regulated in bilateral agreements between each EFTA country and Turkey since the EFTA do not have a common agricultural policy like the EC. Upon the entry into force of this agreement, the EFTA countries will grant Turkish exports, except for some sensitive products, duty-free and QR-free access to their markets while Turkey will, in turn, reduce import charges by 60 to 70 % for imports from the EFTA countries. This rate will be progressively increased to 100 % by January 1996. The list of sensitive products contains essentially textiles, clothing, footwear and leather products in which Turkey maintains a strong competitive edge. The Agreement has been designed to meet the economic challenges of the 1990s in that it stipulates such provisions as competition, state aid, public procurement, intellectual property rights and dumping. These are all the basic subjects of the ongoing negotiations between EC and EFTA on the European Economic Area(EEA). Some Turkish economists bitterly criticised this arrangement, questioning what Turkey stands to gain from the accord which keeps all the competitive Turkish industrial and agricultural products outside its scope while committing Turkey to remove all its tariff and non-tariff barriers for the EFTA products latest by 1996.
But we should not see this agreement in isolation from the goal of the customs union with the EC, which will be incrementally achieved by 1995. The establishment of the customs union in industrial goods would arguably be the most traumatic element for Turkey. Not only would it mean the removal of all tariffs on industrial products from EFTA, Mashreq and Maghreb countries, Israel, Malta, Greek Cyprus and what used to be Yugoslavia; the application of the GSP concessions for the developing countries; tariff-free entry for industrial products from Lome countries (plus symbolic aid to these states); and the adaptation to the Common Customs Tariff for imports from other suppliers. It would further mean the end of the quantitative restrictions - not to mention the non-tariff barriers - on various types of imports. To achieve such a complete liberalisation would require an unprecedented and painful restructuring of the economy. The shock to the industrial sector would be enormous. However, Turkey has carried out most significant part of this liberalisation and restructuring programme since 1980. The difficulties that will arise when the customs union is completed by 1995 are in fact not insurmountable. In 1976 Turkey had stopped making the annual reduction in customs duties needed for the customs union and resumed since 1988 to make regular reductions. It has, however, reduced customs duties for all countries so that, according to the Commission, there has been no real preference for the Community. And if the Turkish tariffs vis-a-vis third countries were to be lower than the common customs tariff, the result could be a deflection of trade. Since 1984 Turkey has gradually introduced a series of taxes on imports that can be regarded as having the equivalent effect of customs duties. Under EC pressure, the Turkish government has, however, decided to incorporate taxes and charges having equivalent effect to import duties into customs duties ('Single Duty System'), which will further serve the creation and the protection of the Community preference. The Commission says that Ankara has still not granted the Community any agricultural trade preferences. On the Community side, imports of Turkish textiles (the most vital component of Turkey's industrial production) are restricted under an informal agreement reached with the Turkish producers. Turkey has initially resisted the negotiation of an agreement under the MFA. It is difficult, for the Turks, to reconcile the existence of a quota arrangement with the spirit of the Association Agreement. Over the past 30 years, Turkey has developed quite rapidly in textiles. While in the initial stage it only produced and exported raw cotton, but its impressive moder- nisation drive in this sector has enabled Turkey to export cotton yard and finally, as from the early 1970s, cotton fabrics. During the 1963-79 period the Turkish textiles production was primarily targetted at the domestic market. It is only in the 1980s that a significant increase in its export to foreign markets has been achieved. In EC markets Turkey enjoys an advantage over the MFA countries even though it mainly exports products covered by the MFA. It was not until September 1982 that an agreement had been reached with the Turkish government on restricting Turkish textile exports to the Community. To keep up with the Community standards and requirements, the Turkish textile industry has already begun a new restructuring process involving the modernization of its machinery at an estimated cost of $ 5 to 7 bn, the usual sources of procurement of which is the European suppliers. Current trade imbalance and anti-dumping charges are other hot topics preoccupying the negotiators on both sides.
Free movement of people, which is a fundamental tenet of the Community and which bears directly on the question of Turkey's Community membership, is in itself not a new issue. The 1963 Ankara Agreement has set out to progressively secure freedom of movement for workers between Turkey and the Community. The 1970 Additional Protocol has, furthermore, stipulated the free movement of workers to be realised in progressive stages between December 1976 and December 1986. The deadline had come and gone by. Although the issue has been shelved due to the well-known Community - and particularly German - sensitivity, it appears likely that Turkey will use this contractual right as one of the trump cards in its future negotiations with the Community. As a matter of fact, even without free movement, there are already more than 2.5 mn Turkish immigrant workers resident in the Community member countries. The EC countries are evidently not prepared to accept any fresh migrations of foreign workers, given the comparatively high unemployment, slow growth and anti-immigrant movements across Europe. Conscious of this situation, the Turkish side is instead giving priority to the EC's recognition of the right of the Turkish immigrants (Euro-Turks) currently resident in the Community territory to move freely as from 1 January 1993.
There can be no doubt that the integration of Turkey into the Community would tend to
reinforce the present regional imbalance inside Turkey. Now the west of the country is the
centre of economic activity and the east is the periphery - a situation, which lies at the
root of Turkey's southeastern question. To combat this problem, at least in part, Turkey
will be able to benefit from the ERDF. Turkey would be a net recipient on the budget, at
least in the early years of membership. Moreover, following the Portugal's example, Turkey
may also apply for special assistance prior to membership to prepare her economy for the
shock of membership. A study by the Commission in 1990 listed 40 sectors out of 120, which
would most likely be affected upon the completion of the Single Market 1992. These sectors
where non-tariff barriers impede intra-Community trade make up about 50 % of the
industrial value added in the EC. In this study, Turkey is compared to the Southern
European country groups within the EC. Turkey, for example, has similar strengths as
Greece in clothing, textile industries and knitwear, with Portugal in ceramics, various
textile products and clothing, as it is with Spain. It should also be pointed out that all
of these countries share strong tourism potential and are competitors in this sector.
According to the 1991 TUSIAD Report, certain sectors in Turkey are classified according to
their current competitive advantage and future developments. Locomotive sectors are
singled out as follows: tourism, clothing and knit-wear, ceramics, glass, processed
food, construction, leather products, non-electrical machinery, tires, petro-chemicals,
iron and steel and etc while sectors with high growth potential include non-ferrous
metals, shipbuilding, motor vehicles, mining products, chemicals and electronics. To sum
it up in a nutshell, the current state of affairs in Turkish economy is still far away
from justifying, on economic grounds, an immediate full integration with the EC, but it
should be noted that Turkey has the capabilities to make up most of its deficiencies in
the pre-accession period. Therefore, Ankara and Brussels should combine efforts to
accelerate the pace of economic moder- nization and adaptation already initiated in
Turkey, bearing the eventual goal of future accession in mind.
b) Political Credentials. The Europeans see, wrongly or rightly, the political freedoms and human right violations as an outstanding problem in Turkey. Ankara has been subjected to vigoruous criticism from the human rights organisations, from the Socialist parties in Europe, from the members of the European Parliament and from most Western governments on the subjects of the ill-treatment of prisoners, the limitation of political freedoms and restrictions on Trade Union activity. The emergence of the 'Kurdish problem' in the political agenda of the relations has further worsened the situation. These issues act directly against the Turkish interests in the Community because the passage of any important agreements with Turkey including the financial protocols, the Commission's Matutes Plan and, of course, the eventual Accession Treaty will all depend on how the EP political groups interpret the situation in Turkey. An increasingly assertive European Parliament is geared to play a decisive role in the future development of the Turco- Community relations since it has the power to slow down or , if wishes so, stop the cooperation process, not mentioning the accession treaty, irrespective of any political decision by the EC leaders. For instance, last January the EP had blocked indefinitely loans and grants to Syria and Morocco in protest of what it termed as 'ill-treatment' in these countries. The 518 MEPs are becoming more and more concerned over human rights issues and tend to link any EC cooperation with improvements in that field. Many MEPs see their new power over international agreements, which they expect to gain from next January, as a useful lever to achieve their objective. Under the Maastricht Treaty on Political Union, MEPs power to approve or reject Association and Accession agreements with other countries was further extended to cover any international agreements that affect the EC's budget, institutions and legislations. To say the least, that covers a lot. The EP has become a powerful force to be reckoned with in every step towards enhanced relationship between Turkey and the EC. If the Parliament says no and the Twelve governments say yes, then the answer is no.
As we already mentioned, the EP broke off official relations with the Turkish Parliament in the aftermath of the 1980 takeover. It was only in September 1990 when the Joint Parliamentary EEC-Turkey Committee has been reinstated upon the adoption of the Walter Report. Eight years had passed without any meaningful dialogue. The Greek MEPs, whose national feelings are often invoked whenever Turkish affairs come to the fore, always act as if they are on the battle front. Even after years after a return to civilian regime, some went so far as to claim that "there has been no change in the political situation in Turkey since the coup [of 1980]". There are of course varying views. Another MEP acknowledges that "without playing down the practical difficulties of the Turkish accession, we have no right to dash Ankara's hopes if we are committed to safeguarding the very security of the West". The latest EP debates and our interviews with the MEPs have, however, indicated that the Socialist Group, which enjoys a good working relationship with the Turkish Social Democrat Populist Party - now the junior coalition partner of the government -, the European Democrats and some members of the European People's Party and Liberal and Democratic Reformists tend to voice a realistic, not always supportive though, position on most issues concerning Turkey. Most support comes from the conservative British MEPs. Faced with a relatively unfavourable audience in the EP, it is difficult to say that the Turks are effectively lobbying and informing the MEPs, who appear to have little (or misinformed) grasp of the Turkish affairs except their mostly one-sided acquaintance with the human rights issues in that country.
In parallel to the growth of the EP's power, an increasing number of businesses, regions and professional & trade organisations have understood the need to take an energetic in the activities of the EP. They are now trying to keep themselves well-informed about the Community activities of direct interest to them, and to influence decisions in these areas. In particular, they consider the advantages of establishing permanent presence in Brussels and Strasbourg. Most significantly, they also try to learn how to intervene effectively from the earliest stages of the decision-making process. Lobbying has already become an everyday reality in the Community institutions. Although they do not seem to have formed a sympathetic group of supporters yet in the EP, the Turks exert little effort, if any, in influencing the European legislators. It is considered a sine qua non, if Turkey is intent on effectively intervening in the earliest stages of the EC decision-making process, for various Turkish groups to establish a powerful presence in Brussels and Strasbourg instead of knocking on the doors of the EC establishment only for specific purposes when required. A wise Turkish lobbying and PR campaign should, however, not be seen as a polish-up exercise, substituting the necessity for comprehensive reforms in the economic and political spheres, but should rather serve It should serve as a supportive and complementary method. The veteran Euro-parliamentarian, Mr. Willy de Clercq, advised that "what is needed is a little more public relations, maybe a little more contact, not so much with your friends but with those who are opposed. That is the best public relations". The experience that Turkey has amply acquired since 1975 in its dealings with the US Congress will no doubt be useful in hammering out a similar strategy towards the EP which must involve, among others, non-governmental bodies, private business, trade unions, universities and political parties, although the composition of the MEPs, their legislative & practical powers and procedures are quite different from the Congress, a fact which calls for a specially-tailored strategy. The Community's social partners including the European Trade Union's Confederation also maintain concerns similar to those of the European Parliament and have made a point of stressing that greater liberty for Trade Union activities and better human rights performance in Turkey will continue to stay one of the preconditions for Turkey's possible accession to the EC.
On Turkey's political arena, several unprecedented events have taken place since 1987. Mr. Demirel, who has been seven-time prime minister until 1980, when he was ousted by the military intervention, made a victorious (perhaps unique in world political history) come-back as the prime minister once again in the November 1991 general elections. His junior coalition partner is the Social Democrat Populist Party, which used to be the main opposition party. The new government with a broad-based popular support has sparked high hopes among all segments of the society. Anxious to establish domestic stability and respond to the Western concerns, the Demirel government has embarked upon a series of sweeping, almost revolutionary, political reforms. Just to reflect on the new thinking of the coalition government on human rights and political freedoms, here is an excerpt from the coalition protocol: "The legal and practical shortcomings, obstacles and limitations that our citizens are facing in the freedom of expression, in the protection and development of their ethnical, cultural and linguistic identity will be eliminated in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of Paris". The Demirel government has, during its first year in office, put the main emphasis on improving democratic structures and removing the last vestiges of the era of military rule. The major constitutional amendments have been agreed between the coalition partners and are now under discussion with opposition parties. The government is pushing on a broad front of political and legal reforms. A draft bill on human rights is on the agenda of the Parliament. Its main provisions aim to combat the prevalence of police ill-treatment, considered to be the single greatest factor tarnishing Turkey's image abroad. Labour laws are being tailored to bring the country in line with the ILO conventions. Although Turkey has covered significant distance in the field of human rights, a lot still remains to be done particularly on trade union rights, torture allegations and tense situation in the southeastern part of the country.
Since 1984, Turkey has been struggling with a guerrilla war in its south-eastern
provinces, launched by a neo-Marxist separatist organisation (PKK). The Government, which
has partially relaxed the atmosphere in that part of the country by acknowledging
officially for the first time the political and cultural identity of the Kurds - until
recently referred to as "mountainous Turks", has so far failed to prevent
escalation of the PKK's brutal terrorist activities in the country. Violence and terrorism
are once again threatening Turkey's stability at the very opportune moment when its
strategic importance in a region which is in the throes of change has at last been
recognized. The recent escalation of violence by the separatist PKK terrorists has
dampened the expectations raised by the new coalition government that has promised to
tackle the 'Kurdish Reality' in line with the Paris Charter and the entry into the
Parliament of outspoken Kurdish-origin representatives. Last March, the Kurdish New Year
was marked by mass violence, resulting in more than 60 deaths. The Turkish security forces
struck in response to a violent campaign by Kurdish militants, who wanted to rehearse an
all-out uprising. From his camps in Damascus, the PKK leader, Mr. Abdullah Ocalan,
declared that "if need be, 100.000 people will die this year".
Gaffney likens the PKK organisation and its ruthless methods to the notorious Khmere Rouge
of Cambodia. Just like in the cases of the unceasing IRA, the Corsican or the Basque
separatist terrorism, Turkey, too, has no other option, but to learn to live with this
separatist movement for long time to come. It cannot easily be curtailed particularly at a
time when the nationalism all over the world is on the increase and it receives en-
couragement and support from Turkey's regional adversaries. The Turks are aware that a
solution to the Kurdish terrorism based on reaction and anger will not prove lasting. The
government's approach is to embrace the local people with affection, isolate the
separatist terrorists and avoid resorting to non-democratic solutions. Perseverance and
patience are needed in handling this delicate, long-standing problem within the boundaries
of democratic mechanisms. The Kurdish issue has taken on an international dimension since
allied intervention to help the Iraqi Kurds. The evolution of some sort of autonomy for
the Kurds in Northern Iraq under Western protection has aroused similar aspirations from
Turkish Kurds. Recognising this, the Demirel government has worked out a new policy
initiative. Apart from the political reforms, a package of economic measures is being
introduced to tackle the south-eastern region's high unemployment and low investments.
However, the ongoing terrorist activities and the resulting climate of uncertainty have
caused an almost halt in investments in southeastern Turkey. The already scarcy
investments in the region have declined 95.8 percent in the first seven months of 1992. In
the meantime, Kurdish Institutes and two Kurdish newspapers have been established. The
government proceeds cautiously on cultural autonomy, which it fears may provide an
environment where the institutional framework necessary for future prospect of indepen-
dence could develop. This is what underlines Ankara's resistance to the notion of such
autonomy. On the other hand, there are plans to give unemployment insurance to 700.000
young people in the region (an easy target of the PKK that recruits its guerrilla force
through abduction and offers of salaries), the minimum wage is to become exempt from tax,
and promises concerning regional investment would be kept. The government's junior
partner, the SHP, is now openly debating the broader constitutional question of devolved
powers, reinforcing the powers of local assemblies, as a means to win back moderate
Kurdish opinion and undercut support for the separatist PKK. The President has been for
some time urging Mr. Demirel to introduce Kurdish television and radio broadcasts for the
south-east region. Mr. Demirel has reportedly commissioned an opinion poll as well, which
showed that 70 percent of people in that region wanted to stay part of Turkey. The
government, faced with the difficult problem of how to combat terrorism while honouring
the commitment to democratic human rights, underlines that what is needed is to
distinguish between the normal democratic demands of Turkey's Kurdish-origin citizens and
the PKK terrorism. The 'Kurdish problem', it seems, will continue to be a painful issue
preoccupying Turkey's domestic and external politics for a long time to come, with obvious
ramifications also on Turkey's relations with the EC. A Turkish accession will be out of
question unless and before this question has been peacefully - perhaps, as some
intellectuals suggest, along the lines of the Spanish model which has greatly achieved to
pre- empt the appeals of the ETA - resolved.
It must be noted that the pressure that the Community and the Council of Europe have kept on Turkey since the 1980 military intervention for greater progress in human rights situation has indeed yielded positive results and a full membership will no doubt reinforce this process a great deal, making the process irreversible. As a matter of fact, politically all latest accessions - Greece, Spain and Portugal - have had at least one strong political element in common: weak and fledging democracies with a recent history of either fascist or military dictatorships. The democratic credentials of an aspiring member are naturally one of the most important pre-requisites to entry. And Turkey is required to live up to the EC standards. Although Turkey has not yet attained a fully equal degree of democratic maturity comparable to that of the Community standard, it has certainly come far enough to date and it is solidly on the way to becoming just as democratic as any EC country. Unlike most EC partners, Turkey has found herself over the past few years in a difficult situation facing a wide range of dramatic economic, political and, more seriously, security challenges. Internal political wranglings, too, tie the hands of the government in a variety of issues. For months the government has been trying to pass the law on court procedures and regulations on detention, a legislative act designed to improve Turkey's human rights record. There are complaints that whatever has been done ever since the arrival of the coalition government nine months ago has been more in the sense of "window dressing" than substantial actions. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that Turkey's geo-strategically sensitive location dictates her to be on constant vigilance towards fundamentalist and separatist designs & threats. No one likes any government breaching civilized norms whatever the pretext might be, but more credit should be given to the attempts of Turkey in the twentieth century to move in the direction of a modern, secular, democratic and free market state. That she has not gone as far as some would like is due to tremendous economic and social problems, plus security concerns (situated in the very center of the increasingly unstable Balkans-Transcaucasia-Middle East triangle), which must be effectively addressed. Democracy is difficult, perhaps the most difficult, to operate and preserve of all known forms of government. It arose in a limited region, among the peoples of western and northwestern Europe, and was transplanted by them to their colonies overseas. It has flourished, or at least survived, in some other places. According to Lewis, only in one country of the Islamic world has democracy continued, despite many difficulties and setbacks, to function and even to flourish. He underlines that in Turkey democracy was neither bequeathed by imperial rulers, nor imposed by victorious enemies. It was the free choice of the Turks themselves.
We tolerate too easily the shortcomings of other European states and are too ready to condemn Turkey out of hand at every possible opportunity without looking at the mirror. Europe, acting out of selfish & narrow interests, has itself failed the human rights test in most instances, notably in the Bosnian case. We would therefore do better to regard Turkey as Europe's most eastern state and encourage, rather than rebuff, the efforts made by the Turks to fulfil their 'historic vocation' in Europe. The fact that an exception was made for the last three entrants and that the three of these countries have proven themselves worthy gives rise to the Turkish argument that why not the same thing should not be offered to Turkey.
c) Security and Defence Dimension.
(Section IV to be continued) ( 23 Mart/March 1998)
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