Yayin Tarihi:23 Ocak/January 1998
TURKEY'S PLACE IN THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE
An Updated Assessment
By
Mehmet ÖGÜTÇÜ
Jean Monnet Fellow
October 1992 Bruges & Paris
Continued from part III - published on 19 January 1998
IV. AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE TURCO-COMMUNITY RELATIONS (1987-1992)
1- TURKISH REQUEST OF ACCESSION AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE.
a) Why Turkey Applied for Full Membership. The motive, on Turkish side, when Ankara applied for associate status back in 1959, was to join another European organisation, which would provide political, economic support and confirm its European identity. It is worth mentioning that the Turkish application had immediately followed that of Greece. The late 50's and early 60's were times when both political and economic circumstances were unusually favourable to such a connection in both Turkey and the Community. There were two unprecedented periods of prosperity, one due to the wheat boom and the agricultural development of the 50's, and the other due to the mounting European demand for Turkish labour.
This time, however, the reasoning was a bit more complicated, involving a variety of considerations. The 1987 bid for accession was generally seen as a conscious decision of the Turkish official think-tank. Historically, Turkey has been part of the European economic system. Anatolia's main trading partners have traditionally been European, whether Venetian, Raguson, Genoese or English. From a strictly practical point of view, the essential objective for Turkey is not EC membership per se, but assured access to the European market. Turkey's powerful industrial, financial and business groups, resentful of the EC's growing protectionism in textiles, steel and agricultural products, have advocated strongly the case for a swift integration with the Community. They are convinced that their future lies in integrating with European markets as early as possible. Trade, investment and economic cooperation are indeed more attractive to them than any inflow of the EC's structural or regional funds. About 60 percent of their trade volume is with the Community. The EC investors also provide 70 percent of foreign investment in Turkey. Obviously, they do not want to lag behind the 1992 Single Market, arguing that "European integration was proceeding steadily and Turkey was being left out because associate members do not have voice while full members do. In a few years it could be too late". For the Turks, it is also a question of being a full member of the Western Club in the face of instability in their volatile and unfriendly region. There is no doubt that political calculations, i.e. neutralising the Greek efforts to exploit the EC mechanisms against Ankara, the Community's future security constellations, etc., have also contributed their share to Turkey's decision to speed up the process of integration with the EC. Like in Greece, Portugal and Spain, some Turks seem to believe that the accession will act as the midwife for a whole series of political and economic reforms, extricating them from chronic internal problems and provide a sound framework of stability. On the desirability of membership, never before has there been such broad public consensus in Turkey with virtually all ideological and political groupings supporting the membership bid - except the Islamic fundamentalists who would rather see the establishment of an Islamic Common Market to counter what they consider the 'Christian crusaders'.
In fact, the Turkish application, when submitted in April 1987, did not come as a surprise at all since earlier signals had already been given to this effect. Some member states conducted a vigorous, but inconclusive, lobbying through their representations in Ankara to delay what has become the inevitable. On the day when the letter of the request of accession was handed over to Mr. Leo Tindemans, the then president-in-office of the EC Council, the Turkish prime minister declared that his country had set out on a "narrow, long and thorny path" towards accession. The general reaction to the long-expected, but evidently unwelcome application from Ankara was rather cool in Brussels. The Foreign Ministers of the member states have decided by 11 to 1 (Greece) to refer the application to the Commission for an opinion in accordance with the routine procedure. The initial remarks underlined that the EC should "first resolve its internal problems before con- templating a new enlargement". The digestion of the Iberian enlargement had priority over any new enlargement. Some member states suggested the negotiation of a better Association arrangement rather than jumping into precipitous membership negotiations. Even in Turkey, most commentators found the application untimely, citing the argument that Turkey was not sufficiently prepared yet for the membership.
It was no doubt a well-calculated risk on the part of Turkey. Ankara knew perfectly well that, despite the remarkable progress made in the previous decade, the state of the Turkish economy was still far from being fit enough to fulfil the requirements of the Treaty of Rome, the 1987 Single European Act, the 1992 Internal Market and, above all, the Community's ambitious goal of the Economic and Monetary Union. In other words, the Turkish Government knew it had only ignited the trigger of a long drawn-out process. The feeling was, however, that the threshold of the Community membership would most likely be raised in the near future (As a matter of fact, the Maastricht decisions proved that point) and that the chance of getting on the EC train might be missed for ever, if not hurried at once. Today Turkey stands, in the league of full membership hopefuls, as the first country to register an application - a mark of foresightedness. Such a big move, it was thought, could pressurize the feet-dragging, evasive Community to face up the Turkish reality and thus, to give a serious consideration to Turkey's expectations. From the statements of the Turkish political leaders, it became obvious that Turkey was not expecting its application to yield an immediate positive response. It recognized the EC's dilemma and its own internal problems for a smooth accession. What actually has been expected from the EC was - and remains - that it sends a political signal to embrace the oldest associate partner into its fold in the not-too-distant future - a green light. Turkey's quest for membership should also be viewed as a natural extension of its historic orientation towards Europe. Full membership would, from the Turkish perspective, confirm and reinvigorate the Western- looking, Ataturkist tradition, giving a valuable external boost to the democratic process in Turkey. Former Turkish Ambassador to the EC (now the Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry), Mr. Ozdem Sanberk summarized the primary Turkish motives as follows: "We felt it was necessary to remove the general uncertainty surrounding the EC-Turkish relations and reinforce the consensus about becoming fully European, in order that our political, economic and social policies might move forward. The opening of the membership negotiations represents to the Turkish people the first step in an irreversible chain of events leading to the full EC membership"
b) An Evaluation of the Community Response. But the Community saw matters differently. On 5 February 1990, the EC Council of Ministers concluded, on the basis of the opinion of the Commission on 18 December 1989, that it was not appropriate that the "Community should accept any further membership applications, given its own changing shape", but reaffirmed the principle enshrined in the Association Agreement that Turkey was eligible for membership. In a plain language, the EC had taken three years to say 'not yet'. The specific reasons given at that time included the challenge faced by the EC over the next few years in completing the third enlargement, the implementation of the 1992 Single Market and the concern over the problems of absorbing Turkey with its current economic and political difficulties. The Council of Ministers decided that Turkey, in the meantime, should be assisted by a comprehensive cooperation package plus financial assistance - known as the Matutes Plan - with a view to helping prepare this country for future accession.
At this point, it might be useful to briefly examine how the Commission had drawn up its opinion. The working method adopted by the Commission involved the establishment of an inter directorates-general working group, which would meet at technical level.( Note that in the cases of Greece, Spain and Portugal, the working group had been set up at the level of Commissioners). The group gathered together all documents and studies about Turkey prepared by reliable national, international/public or private institutions, bodies or agencies. The Commission also invited Turkish officials and experts while at the same time sending fact-finding missions to Turkey. The Commission's draft report was supposedly devoid of any interpretation and assessment - merely a coherent set of data to be considered by the College of Commissioners for the final shape of the opinion. Yet it became clear that the Commission study was not merely a technical survey. And the way in which it was handled by the Commission had aroused justifiable dissatisfaction on the Turkish side. In October 1989, a Commission report classified as "SECRET" and highly negative on Turkey's application was leaked on purpose to the Turkish press evidently to lower the expectations in Turkey as regards the immediate membership. The main conclusions of this report, which came to be known as "Rhein Report", were as follows: "If Turkey is granted accession to the Community, progress towards the Single Market will be seriously hampered. The goals of the EMU and EPU will also loose their momentum. Decision- making process will greatly suffer. Most of the Community resources will be channelled towards rectifying Turkey's difficulties. One-fifth of the EP seats will be occupied by Turkish MEPs. EC's internal harmony will be upset because of Turkey's predominantly Muslim population, Turkish nationalistic sentiments and so on...". This report had highlighted more or less what the formal opinion would look like.
The Commission opinion, which was officially announced on 18 December 1989 by the Commissioner, Mr. Abel Matutes, consists of thirteen articles and two annexes. The opinion stressed that enlargement, not only for Turkey, but also other potential candidates, could be contemplated only after the 1992 Single Market. Moreover, a detailed analysis of Turkey's economic and social development had clearly brought out that in spite of important progress since 1980 in restructuring and opening the economy to the outside world, a major gap still existed in comparison with EC levels of development. In addition, the report pointed to some human rights problems in the country. Long-running disputes with one par- ticular member country, namely Greece and the situation in Cyprus were also cited as issues causing concern in the Community. According to the annexed report, the Turkish economy faces four major difficulties: "existence of important structural disparities in both agriculture and industry; macro-economic inequilibria; high protection in industry; and low social security". The financial burden which Turkey will bring to the EC is also analyzed. Concerns in this field are mostly related to the extension of structural & regional funds, additional budgetary expenditure and negative impact of the Turkish workers on unemployment problem already haunting the Community.
The conclusion part of the Opinion has clearly established the framework for future relations as well as formulating concrete proposals to be implemented. It reads as follows: "The Community propose to Turkey a series of substantial measures which, without casting doubt on its eligibility for membership of the Community, would enable both partners to enter now on the road towards increased interdependence and integration. These measures will focus on the following four aspects - * completion of the customs union, * the resumption and intensification of financial contribution, * the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation, and * the strengthening of political and cultural links. These measures should be situated in the framework of the Association Agreement which currently governs relations between Turkey and the Community." The Commission proposals reflect the basic offerings of the 'Europe' Agreements - no more than them. The Community also undertook to review the arrangements for trade in Turkish textiles and agricultural products and suggested the adoption by Turkey of the common policies essential for the proper operation of the customs union scheduled to be completed by 1995. It was envisaged that the progressive completion of the customs union would give the Community the opportunity to associate Turkey more closely with the Single Market, while taking into account the constraints imposed by the economic disparities between Turkey and the Community.
c) Current State of Affairs. Although the Turks had, as a preliminary reaction, expressed dissatisfaction at the Community response, the Matutes package has met with quite favourable interest from the Turkish government. Despite much discussion, the Community has not so far been able to flesh out this package and put into implementation due to a stubborn Greek veto. The ball still stays in the Community's court. The swift implementation of this package would give an added impetus and vitality to the currently stagnant state of co-operation between Turkey and the EC. There are nevertheless some encouraging signs that the package might soon be translated into action.
Now a quick review of how relations are evolving. The 32nd session of the EEC- Turkey Association Council was held in Brussels (September 1991) for the first time since 1986. Reviving the Turkey-EC Parliamentary Council took much longer because of widespread objections raised by Socialist, Liberal, Green and Communist MEPs to Turkey's political and human rights situation. Since the beginning of 1989 this Council has met eight times. Its work was strongly handicapped by the inactivity of the Association Council, which finally met on 30 September 1991 after five year's interruption. The meeting, the first since 1986, brought together EC foreign ministers and a Turkish government team led by the foreign minister to discuss the further development of Turkey's relationship with the EC. Both sides have clearly stated their political will to strengthen and deepen their relations. The practical outcome of the meeting was the decision to relaunch regular sessions of the 'association committee' in which Turkish and EC officials will carry out detailed work on trade and economic issues. Protocols of adaptation of the Association Agreement to take account of Spanish and Portuguese accession were signed by the Council in July 1987 and received the EP's assent in January 1988 and a similar protocol of adaptation was agreed with Greece in 1988. Based on that protocol, Turkey has begun to enjoy since 1 January 1989 access to the Greek market on exactly the same basis as in other member states - apart from Spain and Portugal where transitional arrangements will continue to apply for some years.
The Commission Vice-President, Mr. Martin Bangemann, paid an official visit to Turkey from 19 to 22 January 1992 and, during his visit, a technical co-operation programme was signed in Ankara. Mr. Bangemann, in his talks with Turkish leaders, expressed the hope to "welcome Turkey soon as a member of the EC" and added that "Turkey was on the threshold of membership", along with the Baltic States and that he considered it "inconceivable" for an EC without Turkey. According to Mr. Bangemann, the prospect of the Turkish membership is not just a vision; the following would in particular play in favour of Turkey's accession: "Ankara will gain more political importance in the post-Soviet era with its political links to the republics of the Caucasus and beyond into Central Asia as well as such projects as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone; it is also making considerable progress both economically and on the road to democ- racy". His statements had evoked some harsh criticism, particularly from the Greek MEPs, who accused him of deviating the established Community position vis-a-vis Turkey. Mr. Bangemann's visit provided the first hints of a new thinking now reportedly taking shape in the Commission about Turkey. A similar line has also been taken up by Ms. Raymond Dury, the Belgian socialist MEP and the rapporteur on Turkey. After a two-day trip to Turkey on 13-14 March 1992, she noted that the Turkish political scene had changed since her last visit in June 1991. She had the opportunity to meet the prime minister, Mr. Demirel as well as other political leaders and human rights organisations. Talks brought to light a willingness to bring about change and democratisation, she stressed. In her opinion, the question of Turkey's accession to the EC can no longer be seen in the same light as in the past and she thus recommended in her report a new approach for improved EC/Turkey relations.
As the relations were about to make a turn for better, the 'Kurdish problem' has made an unwelcome entry onto the regular agenda of the Turco-Community dialogue. The EC has, for the first time and at German insistence, formally protested Turkey's handling of its Kurdish separatist fight. Germany urged its EC partners to "condemn Turkey's attacks on Kurdish civilians and to remind Ankara that as a NATO, Council of Europe and CSCE member, it was obliged to respect human rights". (See the Political Credentials section for a detailed discussion of this issue and its ramifications on Turco-German relations). The EP, too, debated in an emergency session, the 'Kurdish problem' and adopted a resolution on the Kurdish situation in Turkey, calling on Ankara to "respect human rights in its fight against terrorist actions and to take all the necessary measures so as to allow for dialogue leading to a 'democratic and peaceful solution'". The EP resolution called on the Council and the Commission to do "all that can be done, in the framework of the international community, with the aim of finding a definitive solution to the Kurdish question". Turkey has reacted sharply to the EC moves in this regard which it interpreted as 'an indirect encouragement of terrorism'. The Turks stressed that terrorism was the greatest obstacle to the democratization process and that the PKK terrorism and the wishes of the Kurdish people for greater democratic rights were two separate issues which should not be confused. Democratic rights and terrorism need to be distinguished.
The Turkish foreign minister, Mr. Hikmet Cetin, has made in a recent interview what one may call a sober assessment of Turkey concerning the future orientation of the Turco-Community relations. He conceded that Turkey was unlikely to become a full member of the EC before the end of the century while at the same time emphasising that, no matter what happened, Turkey would pursue its long term objective to become "part of Europe and to be in all the institutions of Europe".
At a Gymnich-type meeting, held on 1 and 2 May 1992 in northern Portugal (Guimaraes), EC foreign Ministers agreed to reflect upon the means of strengthening links between the Twelve and Turkey through a "new approach" as a temporary answer to the request for accession filed by the Turkish government. The foreign ministers had entrusted Mr. Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, with preparing a discussion document on the issue. In fact, after his visits to Athens and Ankara in prior to taking over the presidency, Mr. Hurd explained to his colleagues that Turkey was a "growing power" in a region where "instability reigns". In plain terms, according to Mr. Hurd, Turkey would be more than ever a "key element in the Middle East machine, notably regarding the Central Asian Republics" of the former USSR. Bearing in mind Turkey's relationship with these regions, the Community and its member states would be unwise to take Turkey's Western orientation for granted. Though Turkey is clearly keen to respond to a readiness to build up EC/Turkey relations, significant elements in Turkey still pull in the other direction and may be strengthened if the West appears unresponsive. It is in the interests of the Community and its member states to reinforce Turkey's Western orientation and to establish a stable basis for a broad and active relationship with the West. For reasons set out above, Mr. Hurd proposed a global Community policy for Turkey, arguing that the Community and its member states have a clear interest in developing a strategy which reflects the concept of Turkey as a regional power meriting a special, enhanced relationship with the Community. The plan of action proposed by Britain and supported by France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Belgium in varying doses envisages three basic elements to such a new relationship:
i) A more structured and developed political dialogue. This could take place at both the governmental and the parliamentary level, including more regular meetings of Ministers and senior officials, and maintaining and developing the existing dialogue between the Turkish and European Parliaments. The Political Committee should examine how to put political dialogue with Turkey on a firmer and more regular footing, particularly given the range of regional issues on which there are common interests. This should include arrangements with Turkey for more regular political consultations, perhaps once during each presidency, with the TROIKA of Foreign Ministers.
ii) A developing economic relationship. There is clear advantage for all sides in establishing closer economic links. We should aim for significant progress along the lines suggested in the Matutes Package. The Commission's 1987 opinion had emphasized the need to strenghten EC/Turkey relations by building on the existing Association Agreement. To that end, the Commission proposed in 1990 a Cooperation Package which included the completion of a Customs Union by 1996, technical and industrial cooperation, enhanced political dialogue and adoption of the Fourth Financial Protocol (originally initialled in 1981) worth 600 mn ECU (375 mn in budgetary assistance and 225 mn in EIB loans) over five years. Turkey should also be eligible to benefit from the horizontal cooperation programme of the new Mediterranean policy which should now be implemented. Further delay on both points would risk calling into question the validity of the commitment of the Community and its member states to an enhanced relationship with Turkey across the board. It remains in both sides' interests to continue work towards a Customs Union. Turkey has already made progress on customs duties, but the Community needs to encourage movement in a number of areas, including agricultural preferences, intellectual property, transparency of external tariffs and the dismantling of import levies.
iii) A fuller security relationship. Turkey has long been a staunch member of NATO. As security conditions in Europe have changed so too have the structures for ensuring the Alliance's defence. Turkey's security relationship also needs to be modernised, going beyond membership of NATO to include active associate membership of the WEU. In this respect, the package adopted by WEU Ministers on 19 June 1992 was a promising basis for a closer and developing Turkish involvement in European defence issues.
Ankara's initial reaction to the British-led search for an alternative solution to Turkey's accession underlined that the "priorities and timetables of work carried out towards the objective of full membership may be adjusted to prevailing conditions". The Turks say that the British paper contains some very positive elements, but had not fully satisfied them due to its still evasive character vis-a-vis the prospect of future membership. Nevertheless, Ankara has for some reason been led to believe that the presidency of Britain would give some momentum in its relations with Brussels. As the month of July was entered, there was a general feeling that something could be in the offing this time as far as Ankara-Brussels relations are concerned. A recent visit by Mr. Abel Matutes, the EC Commissioner in charge of relations with Turkey, and the statements he made in Ankara served to bolster these heightened expectations as well. Especially when Mr. Matutes intimated at the positive environment for Turkey resulting from London's taking on the Community presidency and the positive prospects in this context for a lifting of the Greek veto on the Fourth Financial protocol for Turkey. A detailed discussion of the Hurd report was deferred to September 12-13 when the EC Foreign Ministers did meet in Hertfordshire (Britain), during which a declaration was also expected on the subject of Turkey. The EC foreign ministers only discussed "informally and in a general way" the increasing role of Turkey and the need for further improvement of the Turco-EC relations. The meeting's practical result proved to be yet another disapppointment. The ministers agreed with Greece during the meeting that a declaration on upgrading political ties with Turkey before the third round of Cyprus talks in New York would give Ankara "the wrong impression", repeating the traditional cliche that nothing much can be expected from the EC to Turkey until such time as the Cyprus problem is resolved. And as a result, although the ministers exchanged views on Turkey, the Hurd report was not formally discussed, thus dashing the hopes for an early upgrading of Turkish-Community ties.
Besides the ever-present Greek obstruction, the fact is that there is currently little room for Turkey in Europe's agenda, which is now taken up by the uncertain future of the European Union as foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty and the after effects of the Danish and French referenda. Then, there is also the question of the new eligible applicants to the Community as well as the status of the Eastern and Central European countries. Under such unfavourable circumstances, the question of the EC normalizing at the earliest its relations with Turkey is difficult to address at the moment in a way that might do justice to the general expectations in Turkey concerning these relations. This might be the case from Turkey's point of view, too, whose own agenda is full due to critical developments in its own region, be these in the Balkans, the Middle East or the Caucasus as well as in its southeastern region. All in all, Ankara does not appear obsessed with the EC membership as was the case in the preceding decade, making it clear that it is not putting all its eggs in the "EC basket" to the exclusion of all else. The interplay of various factors should be taken into account for a proper understanding and assessment of the Turco-Community relationship.
2- FACTORS AFFECTING THE TURCO-COMMUNITY
RELATIONS
(Section IV continues)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
of this article
ULUSLARARASI iLiSKiLER-STRATEJiK ÇALISMALAR'a dön
