Yayin tarihi: 16 Ocak/January 1998
U.S. AND BOLSHEVIK RELATIONS WITH THE TBMM GOVERNMENT
THE FIRST CONTACTS, 1919-1921
H. B. Paksoy, D. Phil.
Published in
THE JOURNAL OF SOPHIA ASIAN STUDIES
(Tokyo) No. 12 (1994). Pp. 211-251
This is a 2-part article
INTRODUCTION
"We have conducted a War of Independence. If the
participants do not record it, its history will be
reduced to fairytales." Kazim Karabekir.1
During the 19th century, the European Balance of Power
struggles were very much in the minds of the participating
politicians and the ranking Civil Servants of the time. That
struggle had spilled over to become, in the words of
Kipling, the "Great Game in Asia." The "Eastern Question"
was but a sub-division of the "Great Game," whose origins
are traceable, inter alia, to the events leading to the
treaties of Turkmenchai (1828), Adrianople (1829); Crimean
War (1853-56) and the Congress of Berlin (1878). The
principal players of the game included the British, Russian
and German empires. What was justified on the surface as a
race to acquire colonies, to take up "white man's burden"
and to bring God's word to the "heathen populations," was
actually a serious competition to secure supplies of raw
materials and markets for industrial goods; or at least deny
them to the opposing states. Those maneuvers were designed
with grand strategic objectives and goals in sight, as
perceived by competing planners. It was in the Caucasus that
the Eastern Question and the Great Game were linked
directly, especially at the outset of the First World War.2
Against this backdrop, the circumstances leading to the
Turkish War of Independence, formally begun during 1919,
were turbulent.3 After the dissolution of the Russian
Tsarist Empire, the British planned to partition the regions
west of the Caspian Sea, with a view to founding a number of
small buffer states between the Bolshevik Russians and the
Middle East. For the purpose, they deployed their troops in
the regions of Merv and Baku. This was a continuation of the
long standing Great Game policies. Simultaneously, the
Ottoman Empire was also undergoing dismemberment4 and its
provinces were being occupied by other Allies of the British
according to the Treaty of Sevres signed by representatives
of the Ottoman government: the French (Adana, Marash and
environs); the Italians (Antalya region); and the Greeks
(with the active support of the British, the Western half of
Asia minor). The Ottoman capital was at that time under the
joint occupation of British, French and Italian troops. They
were reinforced by the local non-Turkish minorities of the
Ottoman Empire, wearing the army uniforms of the occupying
Allied armies, having been induced by the Allied powers to
enlist.
Under these conditions, the first contacts between the
Bolshevik and the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly)5
governments, as well as between the U. S. and the TBMM, were
primarily made through General Kazim Karabekir (1882-
1948)6. Karabekir's visitors from both the U. S. and the
Bolsheviks were charged by their respective governments with
tasks of observing and reporting actual conditions within
TBMM territories.
Though Karabekir evidently did not meet anyone from the
King-Crane Commission7, nor with Admiral Bristol8 of the U.
S. Navy, he kept himself informed of their activities. The
contact with the U. S. Army General Harbord9 came when the
latter led a sizeable delegation, replete with several film
crews, to investigate the state of the territory,
inhabitants and its administrative apparatus. Despite the
amicable contacts between the two men, this connection with
the U. S. side did not develop to the level of those with
the Bolsheviks, according to Karabekir, due to the self-
imposed constraints under which the American side was
operating.
As the Commander of the XV. Army Corps10, from April
1919, Karabekir had to deal not only with the strictly
military matters of his front, but the full economic,
political, religious and diplomatic aspects.11 Fluent in
French and German (also spoke and read Russian), an
experienced troop-commander of the First World War, and
having been exposed to world affairs at decision making
levels in the pre-war period, Karabekir was equipped to
undertake his primarily self-defined duties.
Karabekir's relations with the Bolsheviks were
extensive and complex. As the Bolsheviks did not yet have a
track record, he first had to assess this relatively recent
movement. Thus, he initiated contacts with the Bolsheviks
well before the Red Armies occupied the Caucasus during
1920-1921. Karabekir closely followed the developments
across the Caucasus, selected and appointed the personnel to
represent the TBMM government in several capitals, outlined
their negotiation parameters, and kept a close watch on the
economic, political and diplomatic conditions in the
neighboring territories --including Iran and Afghanistan.
Karabekir's contacts with Moscow, perhaps more important
than his military activities, are significant in the early
history of the Turkish Republic. Through these channels of
communication, the TBMM government was able to exchange
diplomatic missions, and secure two initial financial aid
packages from Moscow, enabling the TBMM to carry forward the
Turkish National War of Independence. In the intervening
period, as he learned more about the new ideology, Karabekir
remained a Nationalist and firmly in opposition to
Bolshevism in his homeland. In addition to instigating the
Erzurum Congress (23 July - 7 August 1919), it was Karabekir
who, with those thoughts in mind, convened and negotiated
the Kars Treaty of 1921, signed between the TBMM and the
Bolshevik government that established the basis of the
present borders between the USSR and the Turkish Republic.
This study explores the initial TBMM contacts with the U. S. and the Bolsheviks.12
THE MANDATE
During 1919, under military occupation, the functions
of the Istanbul Ottoman government increasingly came under
the direct rule of foreign powers.13 While each of the
Allies was engaged in disseminating its own views, often in
competition against one another, a relatively new political
ideology and, simultaneously, a resurgence of colonialism
appeared on the scene. These were first applied in Istanbul
for eventual transmittal into the interior of the country:
Bolshevism and the Mandate. Several of the Powers
volunteered for the Mandate, or "advised" each other to take
it on. In fact, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919
established a special body, "The Inter-Allied Commission on
Mandates in Turkey" pursuant to the Secret Treaties among
the Allies signed between 1915-1917. However, economic and
political competition among the powers complicated the
issue. There were also disagreements even among the various
agencies of each Power as to how the Mandate issue ought to
be approached. Many favored partition of the Ottoman
territories based upon "existing knowledge," the nature of
which was not publicly divulged. Others urged comprehensive
studies of conditions on the ground before drawing lines on
the map. Some of those arguments were even previously
printed, either as official position papers, or as "private"
lectures.14
As befits the earlier European Balance of Power
Struggles, the disagreements among the Allies generally
stemmed from the politico-economic benefits to be derived
from the mandated areas, and their division. This was most
apparent from the specific oil exploitation agreements. For
example, "...by April 1919, France and Great Britain had
signed the Long-Berenger Oil Agreement, which became the
basis of the San Remo Oil Agreement of 24 April 1920. By
this agreement Great Britain and France delimited their oil
interests in Russia and Romania, British and French
colonies, and especially in Mesopotamia. France was allotted
a 25 per cent share in the oil exploitation."15 Shortly
before the Royal Navy had begun converting its fleets from
coal to oil burners, and the "Oil Policy in the Middle
Eastern Mandates" was already being discussed between the U.
S. and Great Britain.16 Thus, when the 10 August 1920
Sevres Treaty was signed as a supplement to the Treaty of
Versailles (signed on 28 June 1919)17, the division of economic
benefits was already agreed upon between the European Allies.
Therefore, the Sevres Treaty essentially was providing the
political framework through which the
earlier economic treaties were to be enforced, by dividing
the territories of the Ottoman lands, including Asia Minor,
among Great Britain, France and Italy, and their local
Allies.
Following the Sevres Treaty, U. S. and Great Britain
began a diplomatic correspondence concerning the economic
rights of the U. S. in the region under discussion. Great
Britain, while not disputing the rights of the U. S.,
pointedly suggested that the issue be considered within the
League of Nations context. However, since the U. S. "had not
taken her seat at the League of Nations," controversy
continued.18 As one consequence, the U. S. did not become a
participant in the Lausanne Convention, which culminated in
the July 1923 Lausanne Treaty19. However, the U. S.
attained the status of Observer, with full rights to have
representatives present in all discussions. Shortly after
the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, the U. S. and Ankara
Governments concluded their bilateral agreement, the first
of many to come, "providing for protection of philanthropic
and religious enterprises, free navigation, adjustment of
claims, safeguarding of minorities, regulation of
naturalization, and archeological research." On 12 October
1927, the first U. S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew presented
his credentials to the first President of the Turkish
Republic, Mustafa Kemal [Ataturk].20
During 1919, under the conditions of military
occupation, both Bolshevism and the Mandate found
enthusiastic supporters in Istanbul and even attracted
interest among some leaders of the Nationalist movement. The
first to receive consideration was the American Mandate,
since the proposals for the individual or collective
British, French and Italian Mandates were most vehemently
opposed. Despite that, British propaganda was intensifying
to take the mandate21. To facilitate it, the Ingiliz
Muhipleri Cemiyeti [Friends of England Society] was
established in Istanbul, with branches planned at every
major population center and even a Ladies Auxiliary22.
Aware of the efforts, Admiral Bristol became alarmed and
sent requests to the American Peace Commission in Paris (in
February 1919) for an investigative commission. The Allied
censorship exercised over the Istanbul press was so tight,
Admiral Bristol was unable to secure an outlet for his
Government's official views.
Apparently, Admiral Bristol was acquiring his own
information in every way possible, as he worked to persuade
his superiors on the need for the U. S. Mandate. The first
U. S. contact mentioned by Karabekir was with a Lieutenant
"said to be an adviser to Admiral Bristol." This Lieutenant
accompanied Rawlinson23 to Erzurum, along with a Russian
Colonel of the Denikin forces24, on 29 June 1919. Karabekir
does not identify the Lieutenant by name, or his Service
affiliation, but appears to be impressed with the ideas
expressed by this Lieutenant and his manner.25 Karabekir
also indicates that there were a number of other U. S.,
French26, Russian officers passing through his territory
during this period, on their way to the Caucasus. On 3 July
1919, the Ottoman General Staff Intelligence Department
circulated a summary of Istanbul newspaper accounts, on the
arrival in Istanbul from the Caucasus of a twelve member U.
S. delegation, on its way to the Paris Peace Conference to
submit its report. Since the King-Crane Commission did not
arrive in Istanbul for another month, and the Harbord
Commission followed King-Crane Commission's departure, this
12 man delegation must have been concerned with the proposed
Mandate in the Caucasus.
Indeed, members of the Missionary Board, the Food
Relief, plus various lone military officers were appearing
at sundry locations in the Caucasus under a multitude of
designations and duties.27 A number of the other
"Delegates" proved to be at best impostors, being mainly
persons from among the local allies of the Occupying Powers.
Some of these even appropriated the officer uniforms of the
British and the French armies, and impersonated allied
officers to the detriment of all concerned.28
The American Commission to Negotiate Peace (which had
its own Intelligence Section) finally recommended a
Commission to be sent to Turkey to investigate the proposal
for the U. S. Mandate. Approved by President Wilson29,
King-Crane Commission was formally charged with its
specified duties by the Secretary of State R. Lansing on 30
April 1919. On 29 May 1919, the King-Crane Commission,
officially designated as the American Section of the Inter-
Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey, left Paris by rail.
The Commission first went to Syria and Iraq. The Turkish
portion of the King-Crane Commission's investigations began
on 23 July 1919, upon their arrival in Istanbul. On 31 July,
the Commission began interviews of all political parties.30
Despite the censorship, on 1 August 1919, Istanbul
newspapers report the arrival in Istanbul of an American
Delegation, which contacted the representatives of all
political parties there. This break in the apparent news
embargo was perhaps because the King-Crane Commission made
its presence widely-felt by contacting large groups of
interested parties, to obtain their positions with a view
toward reporting the entire spectrum to the Paris Peace
Conference. Admiral Bristol's efforts finally bore fruit.
Karabekir learned that a memorandum was adopted by an
amalgamation of political groups in Istanbul, containing the
framework of an American Mandate, to be handed to the
American delegation 13 August 1919.31 Consequently, the
Erzurum Congress, which has been in session since 23 July
(until 7 August 1919)32 sent a memorandum to President
Wilson on the same day (1 August). It was probably also
meant to remind all other parties of Wilson's 14 Points and the
fact that the Nationalists were aware of them.33 Among
the objectives of the Nationalists was, it appears, to
signal the resolve of the Nationalists to the interested
parties, and display their intent not to tolerate
indiscriminate political pressure.34
On 7 August 1919 Rawlinson and his staff left the
Eastern Asia Minor where they have been residing since the
Armistice.35 On 9 August 1919, two Americans arrived in
Erzurum by way of Diyarbakir-Van-Beyazit. Karabekir
indicates that they evaded the question of what they were
hoping to find. Karabekir surmises their mission was "to
determine if the area is suitable for the 'mandate.'"36
What began as a suggestion to the Nationalists to
accept the American Mandate at the time of the Erzurum
Congress, became a major campaign immediately afterwards. By
the time Sivas Congress was convened37, no less than three
channels were working on the Nationalist leadership to
persuade them at least to "consider" the American Mandate,
if not outright adopt a resolution in favor of it at the
Sivas Congress. Even a sample copy, to provide the bases of
such a resolution, was supplied through two of the channels.
On 17 August 1919 a telegram from the III. Army Corps
(Sivas) indicates that one Vasif Bey had forwarded a report
on the American Mandate to Mustafa Kemal. Moreover, Vasif
Bey desired to send two members of the American
Investigative Committee [meaning the King-Crane Commission]
to Erzurum, to discuss the wishes of the people38. Just
about that time, in a cable sent to Karabekir on 23 June,
Mustafa Kemal indicated he was considering the suitability
of Bolshevism for the Movement.39
The second channel was through Ismet Bey [Inn]40 to
Karabekir. On 30 August 1919, a Staff Officer41 had brought
the American Mandate proposals of Izzet Pasha42 by way of
Ismet Bey from Istanbul to Trabzon43. On 4 September 1919,
that Memorandum signed by Izzet Pasha reached Karabekir44.
Ismet Bey sent along a personal letter to Karabekir urging
him and the Representatives at the Erzurum Congress to give
it due thought.45
Efforts were also underway to relay the American
Mandate Memorandum directly to the participants of the Sivas
Congress about to convene, attempting to "go over the heads"
of the Nationalist leadership. Karabekir delayed the
dissemination of the Memorandum, and moreover refrained from
discussing it with anyone. Ismet Bey followed it up several
times, writing even directly to Mustafa Kemal46, who
relayed Ismet Bey's communication to Karabekir on 4 December
1919 with a request that the contents of the American
Mandate Proposal ought not be made available to the
Representative Council [the early nucleus of the TBMM]47.
Ismet Bey wrote again to Karabekir specifically stating he
was aware that the American Mandate Memorandum was in
Karabekir's hands (on the strength of the courier's report
who returned) and Karabekir ought to relay it to the
Representative Council without further delay.48 By way of
proof, Ismet Bey enclosed a telegram and its answer, one of
the addressees and respondents was Mustafa Kemal, who flatly
stated that the Proposal had not arrived.49
Vasif Bey was also attempting to make the existence of
the American Mandate proposal public by disseminating it
more widely. For the purpose, he informed the III. Army
Corps (Sivas) Command that copies were sent to others. News
of these actions reached Karabekir.50 Vasif Bey also
contacted the XX. Army Corps (Ankara) Commander Ali Fuat51,
who was a close friend of Mustafa Kemal. In turn, Ali Fuat
also notified Karabekir of the communication.52 Finally,
Karabekir wrote a terse cable to Ismet Bey, sending a
verbatim copy to the Representative Council, which included
Mustafa Kemal.53 In no uncertain terms, Karabekir
reiterated that the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses constitute
the decisions of the people, therefore ought not to be
evaded. Mustafa Kemal thanked Karabekir, adding he entirely
agreed with Karabekir's position.54 Karabekir notes that
three days later (on 9 January 1920) the Bolsheviks occupied
Odessa and the U. S. vessels in Istanbul received orders to
return stateside.55 In the end, although the Paris Peace
Conference had agreed to a U. S. Mandate, and in
competition, the British continued work to establish a
British Mandate on the same territory, there was to be no
outright mandate as originally envisioned.
It is of interest to raise a question, with several
parts: Who on the U. S. side gathered the necessary
intelligence to link Izzet Pasha-Ismet Bey-Kazim Karabekir
and Ali Fuat with Mustafa Kemal?56 Who managed to obtain a
Memorandum in favor of the American Mandate from Izzet Pasha
and transmitted it to Karabekir? Performance of these tasks
suggests the existence of not only an information gathering
network, but also an operational capability --since Istanbul
was under Allied occupation, and the occupying forces
controlled all governmental functions, especially the
appointments and movements of the Ottoman army officers. As
the U. S. was not an occupying power, how was it that a
memorandum directly opposing the position of the occupying
powers was being relayed through Ottoman channels? Moreover,
because the King-Crane Commission did not leave Istanbul to
investigate, and instead invited a myriad of individuals and
committees to come and present their opinions, the views of
the Nationalists in Asia Minor were not represented before
the King-Crane Commission, except by unsanctioned proxy.57
Although the Harbord Commission made an attempt at least to
see the land, it arrived after most of the cited initiatives
were already completed. Consequently, the Harbord Commission
could not have played a role in getting the American Mandate
Proposal to the Nationalist leadership. It is unlikely that
the King-Crane Commission could have collected and sifted
through the information, identified opportunities, built the
channels and acted (including securing leave of absence and
travel permit for the courier officer), all within two
weeks. So the original question stands: Who was able to perform
all of the foregoing? One possibility, the logical
one, is Admiral Bristol. Although Karabekir does not
specifically record, it appears he, too, maintained contact
with Admiral Bristol by way of unofficial
representatives.58
The Harbord Commission sailed from Brest on the U.S.S.
Martha Washington on 20 August 1919 and arrived in Istanbul
on 2 September. The Harbord Commission report was completed
on 16 October 1919, on board ship.59 In the intervening
period, General Harbord met Mustafa Kemal on 20 September
1919, who informed Karabekir.60 Karabekir not only already
knew of the impending arrival of General Harbord, but was
aware of the composition of his retinue, the types of
questionnaires they carried, the questions they asked others
on the way, and their itinerary.61 General Harbord arrived
in Erzurum on 25 September 1919, was welcomed in the best
tradition and ceremonies by Karabekir and his Staff. Dinner
was served in the Headquarters dining hall, decorated with
U. S. and Turkish flags for the occasion, in accompaniment
to a live trio of piano, violin and flute. Next to each
American officer sat a foreign language speaking member of
Karabekir's Staff. These gestures were not lost on the
visiting delegation. Karabekir also prepared a detailed
report directly addressing the Commission's concerns and
presented it to General Harbord.62 The two men also held
lengthy private talks, apparently speaking French, and
attended plays staged by war orphans being cared for by
Karabekir and the XV. Army Corps (Erzurum).63 Karabekir had
earlier written the plays himself.
The other mandate seekers, with pecuniary and political
ambitions, were not yet prepared to leave the scene. Several
local dignitaries and former officials affiliated with the
occupation government in Istanbul appeared in the Malatya-
Diyarbakir region in the company of Major Noel of the
British Army.64 Intelligence reports started pouring onto
Karabekir's desk.65 A number of the visitors were
specifically sent from Istanbul for the occasion.66 All had
previously held high administrative positions particularly
in Eastern Asia Minor, and reportedly had accepted payments
between one hundred fifty to over two hundred thousand
Pounds Sterling each, and were expending efforts to cause a
"tribal incident" in Eastern Asia Minor.67 Such an
"incident" involving the Kurds would have prepared the
international public opinion for a politically acceptable
occupation and division of all Asia Minor. That would also
have forced the U. S. government to rescind Article 12 of
Wilson's Memorandum, thereby removing from the equation the
Nationalists, who were preventing both the occupation and
the mandate.68 Acting jointly, Commanders of the XIII.
(Diyarbakir), III. (Sivas), and XV. (Erzurum) Corps
concentrated their efforts towards preventing any staged
incident from taking place within their jurisdictions.69
Orders and detachments went out to arrest the named
dignitaries and ex-administrators, who returned hastily to
Istanbul via Aleppo.70 On 6 September 1919, a compilation
of the "Crimes of the Cabinet" in Istanbul was drafted and
sent to the Sivas Congress, followed by a detailed expose of
the plotters.71
At that point, Istanbul occupation governments attempted to consolidate the "troubles" in Asia Minor in the crucible of "Bolshevism." On 19 September 1919, while the Harbord Commission was investigating the conditions in Asia Minor, Prime Minister Damat Ferit gave an interview to a French wire service, which was duly reported in the Istanbul papers. Damat Ferit asserted that beginning with the Samsun and Trabzon regions, Asia Minor was falling into the hands of the Bolshevik inspired groups. Since Bolshevism was already understood to be against religion and tradition, the interview was meant to incite the population against the "Bolshevik inspired groups" in Asia Minor.72 To counter the propaganda in kind, Nationalists had appropriately worded petitions sent directly to the Sultan in Istanbul, with copies to General Harbord.73 By the beginning of 1920, as the Bolshevik armies started pushing Denikin's forces South, this type of public opinion campaigns began proliferating. They were to reach monumental proportions after the defeat of Denikin forces became public knowledge.74
BOLSHEVISM
Halil and Nuri Pashas75, who were arrested and imprisoned
by the British in Batum, inexplicably managed a
jailbreak. Both individually began private operations in the
Caucasus against the Bolsheviks, continually urging
Karabekir to support them militarily. Karabekir, long
familiar with the pair, remained unconvinced of the
propriety and utility of their activities and argued that
their initiatives were tantamount to adventurism. Having
fought the tsarist Russian armies in the First World War,
Karabekir was not a Russophile. Neither a Russophobe,
Karabekir looked upon the Bolshevik movement as a possible
lever against the occupying Allies who were endeavoring to
physically surround the TBMM movement. He was aware, too,
that the Allies were expending an all out effort to contain
the Bolsheviks north of the Caucasus, and hoped to use the
small independent states of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia
as a buffer zone between the Russians and the Middle East.
This was also planned by way of another "Mandate," and,
inter alia, the Italians were being encouraged to take this
assignment.76 All three Caucasus states had declared
independence in 1918, and the first two were granted de
facto recognition early in 1920, after Denikin's defeat. All
three sent delegations to the Paris Peace Conference,77 but
not all gained "full accreditation." Karabekir's analysis
indicated that under no circumstances would these three
Republics be able to contain a Bolshevik military advance,
for they lacked not only organization, trained cadres, but
also the population. Therefore, Karabekir thought, only a
political solution could save these three entities.78 He
endeavored to provide any such help that was feasible under
the circumstances.79
Cognizant of the critical importance of collecting
reliable and continuous information, after consulting with
Rauf Bey80 and Mustafa Kemal, Karabekir sent Doctor Fuat
Sabit to Moscow81. The aim was to maintain close contact
with the intentions and actions of the Bolsheviks. As noted
earlier, Mustafa Kemal was also making demarches concerning
Bolshevism.82 Moreover, Karabekir had established
intelligence links into the Caucasus, at times sending
officers from his command. The information flow is evident
from the contents of the copious circulars Karabekir was
telegraphing to the other Army Corps and the TBMM
leadership.
Meanwhile, skirmishes between the French colonial
forces and the citizens of Antep, Marash and Adana began.
Later the fighting spread to Urfa and environs. The French
withdrew.83 Contacts with the Italians in the Antalya
region was under observation. The British were attempting to
recruit junior Ottoman army officers, even encouraging them
to desert from Karabekir's Command, for the military units
to be fleshed out by the Caucasians, whose sole aim would be
to fight the Bolsheviks. All publications, domestic or
foreign, were awash with news of Bolshevik military
advances. Concurrently, news of social unrest in the home
countries of the occupying Allied Powers were being touted.
Some were premature, or exaggerated, but the general tenor
was not entirely misleading. The Istanbul government, under
the leadership of Damat Ferit and Ali Kemal, was also
increasing its Bolshevik attributions to the TBMM movement,
to turn the support of the Turkish population away from the
TBMM. For a while, it appeared that the Bolshevik propaganda
had gained the upper hand. The TBMM seriously began
considering this new development.84 The TBMM leadership had
to prepare simultaneously for both war and peace, an
inherently demanding set of circumstances, both against the
internal and external adversaries, in political and military
arenas.
Once again, Rawlinson appeared in Erzurum, around
February 1920. He and Karabekir paid courtesy visits to each
other. Rawlinson was interested in discovering the extent of
Karabekir's knowledge concerning developments then in
progress in the Caucasus and about the Bolsheviks. Aware of
Rawlinson's communications with the British Istanbul Center
via long and cyphered telegrams, Karabekir simply suggested
that Rawlinson could directly ask Batum (where the British
also maintained a Center) or Istanbul. Next day, Karabekir
received a cable from Sevket Turgut Pasha (at that moment,
the Chief of the Ottoman General Staff of the Occupied
Istanbul government)85 posing basically the same type of
questions put to him by Rawlinson the previous evening.
Karabekir, considering this a new tack, provided an outline
of information generally available.86 During the following few
days Karabekir was sending a much different set of
cyphered telegrams to other Army Corps Commanders and the
Representative Council, providing specific intelligence. In
contrast to the intelligence summaries sent from the
Representative Council in Ankara to Karabekir during those
days, it appears Karabekir's network possessed more reliable
sources, at least pertaining to the East.
Next, Rawlinson began probing Karabekir for a military
operation, encouraging him to reclaim the three Eastern
Ottoman Provinces lost to the tsarists during 1877, and
again in 1914 campaigns.87 In the light of the other
information available to him, Karabekir concluded that the
British no longer had faith in any other means of containing
the Bolsheviks except by the "use" of the TBMM forces. As a
side benefit, Karabekir thought, such an action by the TBMM
would have eliminated the TBMM military resistance to the
occupying powers in Istanbul. As the means of containing
Bolshevism, the transition in Allied thinking from direct
Mandate plans to encouraging the Anti-Bolshevism of TBMM
began. But, this was not entirely obvious to the TBMM.88
The principal TBMM concern was that the TBMM territories
were in danger of being entirely and completely surrounded
by hostile forces, eventually drowning the movement.
Therefore, the TBMM leadership had to consider all
possibilities of preventing that anticipated encirclement.
In that endeavor, the Bolsheviks could be either an ally, or
an adversary. The Bolsheviks could aid the TBMM in breaking
the blockade of the Allies, or, if the TBMM leadership did
not resist, engulf and devour the TBMM themselves in
accordance with earlier tsarist goals and plans.89 In fact,
shortly afterwards, it became clear that the Bolsheviks
merely postponed their overt plans of demanding land90, and
were about to mount a "revolutionary movement" from within
the TBMM territories, preferrably beginning in Ankara91.
For the purpose, a Turkish Communist Party was already
established and became "operational" in Baku. In addition,
during 1920-1921 the Bolshevik government was funding Enver
Pasha in Moscow, who in turn was preparing a secret
organization out of previous CUP personnel to take over the
TBMM movement. The intentions and the direction of the
Bolshevik philosophy and policies was just gaining clarity
in the minds of the TBMM leadership.
For its own part, Moscow was hard at work.92 Lenin
made no secret of his intentions, according to Times
[London] of 16 January 1920, which reached Karabekir on 25
February 1920. The circumstances required immediate sorting
of the information.93 One cable from Rauf Bey, in the
context of reports from Dr. Fuat Sabit, allowed a modicum of
comparison.94 Dr. Fuat's letters provided information on
the Bolshevik leadership's thoughts and pointed to British
plans to form a confederation involving Southern Azerbaijan,
and the portion of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic95, then
independent, previously occupied by the tsarist regime.96
However, that channel was about to outlive its usefulness, if
indeed it ever was of any true help. Dr. Fuat had been
coopted by the Bolsheviks.97
On 16 March 1920, the British forces launched a night-
time attack on Ottoman troops, while they slept, in
Istanbul. The British occupied the Chambers of the recently
elected Representative Assembly (Meclisi Mebusan), the
Ministry of War, and later the telegraph offices. The TBMM
leadership in Ankara had received early warning of the event
a day earlier, "from Italian sources."98 Immediately
afterwards, the Representatives of the Occupying Powers
(signing with that designation only) telegraphed a circular
letter to all provinces, asking the Governors and other
officials in charge to inform the population of a series of
arrests (including the Deputies) and new orders, in
favorable words and report back immediately. Karabekir
ordered that Governors in the XV. Army Corps region should
not answer the cable at all.99 Karabekir also ordered
Rawlinson be taken into protective custody, preferably
within the confines of his residence.100 Rawlinson
voluntarily withdrew the Union Jack he was flying from the
upper floors of his house.101 Rawlinson and Karabekir
exchanged very polite messages, conveying understanding of
the circumstances to each other.102
On 17 March 1920, Karabekir sent additional officers
from his command to Azerbaijan, in order to gather reliable
information on the Bolshevik movements. On the same day,
three Bolsheviks, sent by Lenin to Istanbul seven months
earlier, surfaced in the vicinity of Trabzon. They were on
their way to Batum and had been charged with the duty of
establishing contacts with individuals and political parties
favorable to Bolshevism and to found an organization.103
This Bolshevik Delegation had a list of questions, the
contents of which were cabled to Karabekir. Karabekir
provided answers via the 3rd Division in Trabzon. He also
advised the TBMM leadership in Ankara. In response, Mustafa
Kemal, writing on behalf of the TBMM on 18 March 1920,
cabled his complete agreement with Karabekir's comments to
the said Delegation. Ankara leadership also agreed with
Karabekir's recommendations to convene the TBMM in Ankara,
with the participation of those Representatives who had
escaped British arrest in Istanbul.104 Subsequently it was
learned that Rauf Bey and Vasif Bey were forcibly detained
by the Allies, press and communications censorship tightened
in Istanbul.105
On 23 March 1920, two Bolshevik Inspectors [no names
cited] arrived in the vicinity of Trabzon,106 to rendezvous
with Batum Bolsheviks. One of whom stated he was sent from
Moscow to gather information on the conditions in Batum. An
officer representing Karabekir was also present in the
meeting, by prior arrangement.107 The Bolsheviks provided
information on their strength, conditions in the Caucasus,
their own programs. They appeared to have detailed knowledge
on the activities of Halil and Nuri Pashas. Karabekir sent
an additional set of questions and received answers. The
Inspectors did not possess authority to negotiate but
indicated that they would request a Plenipotentiary from
Moscow for the purpose, and suggested a counterpart be
designated from the Turkish side. In fact a three man
delegation had already been sent to Istanbul some two months
earlier; it was headed by one Can Bey, and included a
colonel and an engineer. Moreover, a person authorized to
speak on the affairs of the Caucasus was about to arrive in
Tbilisi [presumably from Moscow], and he would be invited to
Batum. They also asserted that many German engineers,
officers had joined the Bolsheviks, bringing along their
weapons and industrial plants. The two individuals returned
to Batum on 25 March.108
Karabekir established two more intelligence gathering
points, in Kars and Sarikamis. On 25 March, an armed
skirmish took place between the National Forces [Kuvai
Milliye]109 and the British units in the vicinity of
Izmit.110 On 26 March, a wireless set became operational in
Erzurum, began gathering open news broadcasts by all
parties. Two others were established in Bayazit and Van.111
On 27 March, a French representative resident in Trabzon
provided personal opinions to the Governor of the province,
and requested contact with Karabekir, indicating his
opposition to British policies and promising to work in
favor of the TBMM cause in the Paris Peace Conference.
Karabekir sent word that such matters required the attention
of TBMM in Ankara. Separately, Rawlinson proposed to serve
as a mediator between the TBMM and the British Headquarters
in Istanbul. The suggestion was accepted by the TBMM side,
but rejected by the British Istanbul Headquarters. Those
previous members of the Representative Assembly managing to
break through the Allied blockade began arriving in Ankara.
Among them were author Halide Edib [Adivar]112, President
of the Assembly Celaleddin Arif Bey, as well as Ismet Bey
[Inn].
On 11 April, Artillery Lieutenant Ibrahim Efendi
returned from Baku, after having established contact, as
ordered, with Halil and Nuri Pashas. The letters he carried
were signed "Turkish Communist Party" and with its
abbreviation, TKP. A significant item in the letters was the
request for a Plenipotentiary from the TBMM side, to
coordinate actions with the Bolshevik organizers in Baku,
whose names and duties were also noted.113 Karabekir
relayed the information to TBMM, including its appendix of
organization charts. Next day, Karabekir was notified of the
arrival of another courier, Riza Bey, the Commander of the
7th Regiment, 3rd Division, XV. Army Corps. The letter he
carried was signed Baha Sait114, containing more
information on the Bolsheviks, including the news that the
Plenipotentiary sent by Moscow to Istanbul was on his way
back and arrived in Baku from Istanbul. Baha Sait's letter
was also relayed to Ankara, in cyphered sections. Karabekir
saw the need to pose a question to Mustafa Kemal: "...In his
letter, Baha Sait often refers to an Agreement signed in your
name115 in Istanbul, and handed to the Bolshevik
Plenipotentiary. I surmise this is the agreement relayed to
you by Rauf Bey [Orbay]. A copy of it shall be
appreciated."116
The next day, Karabekir sent a longer cable to Mustafa
Kemal, providing comments: "...it seems plausible that the
said Agreement may have been seen by a Delegation of the
Istanbul Government [membership in which is] as yet unknown
to us....Baha Sabit Bey's Chief of Staff is a Russian....the
declaration made by the Istanbul Government following their
occupation [of the Meclisi Mebusan] and related threats, to
the Provincial Governors in the said circular to prevent any
cooperation with the Bolsheviks, indicate Istanbul's
[Allies'] awareness of this Agreement....Yusuf Ziya Bey
arrived from Baku with [an unspecified amount of] money,
went to Oltu. He attempted activities which he tried to keep
secret from me [he and apparently TKP acting on its
own]....Bolsheviks requesting our military intervention by
the XV. Army Corps in the Caucasus during the winter months
require careful evaluation...."117
Mustafa Kemal responded with a short cable, requesting
that Karabekir establish contacts with the Bolsheviks at the
earliest possible time, noting the Ankara group was aware
and appreciative of all previous demarches made by
Karabekir. Karabekir wrote back a long answer, first
outlining the background of all past contacts with the
Bolsheviks through his command, adding his analysis of what
the Bolsheviks are trying to do against his forces and his
precautions. Since "....Halil and Nuri Pashas no longer
constitute a viable channel, it is imperative that a TBMM
Plenipotentiary be sent to Moscow without delay to establish
direct contact..."118 On 15 April 1920, Mustafa Kemal
cabled the following: "I reiterate, the Agreement referenced
by Baha Sabit Bey, was not signed by me. Copy of the said
document follows." The "Agreement" in question stated that
it has been contracted between the Usak Congress and the
"Karakol Cemiyeti"119 on one side, both of whom
representing the Turkish Revolution, and the [unnamed]
Caucasus Plenipotentiary of the Ishtirakiyun [Social
Democrat] Party Central Committee, acting on behalf of the
People's Commissars of the Rusya Mttehit Sovyetler
Cumhuriyeti [Russian Soviet Federated Republic]. It further
stated that Baha Sait Bey was signatory on behalf of the
Usak Congress and the Karakol Cemiyeti, as their
Plenipotentiary accredited to Caucasus. Signed on 11 January
1920 in Baku.120
Mustafa Kemal followed up with another cable, with two
supplements. "The said Agreement was sent for signature by
Kara Vasif Bey.121 Following are the answers I sent in
response to that proposal, and the [separate] letter I wrote
to Rauf Bey. I absolutely did not sign [the Agreement]. Baha
Sait Bey is constructing falsehoods. If Kara Vasif Bey had
signed it on behalf of the Karakol Cemiyeti without our
knowledge, we repudiate it. As we shall not undertake any action
in that regard without your knowledge, participation
and agreement....you may refute it [in any strength] as you
think necessary..."122 Karabekir surmised that Baha Sait's
position was weakened when the local Bolsheviks in the
Caucasus realized that TBMM side was in high level contacts
with the Bolsheviks through Dr. Fuat and Halil Pasha, and
that Baha Sait was not representing the TBMM. Baha Sait thus
endeavored to regain credibility by engineering such an
Agreement and that may be the reason behind the Bolshevik
requests for a TBMM Plenipotentiary. Karabekir apparently
was partially correct, since the Karakol Cemiyeti was being
funded by the Bolsheviks through Enver Pasha; quite apart
from the TKP. After that evaluation, Karabekir sent two
cables to the Representative Council in Ankara on 18 April
1920. The first was in response to the cable of 15 April,
proposing the specific personnel to constitute the advance
military delegation being sent to Baku, to be later followed
by the full Commission. The second telegram outlined the
instructions to the military delegation Karabekir proposed
to send. As no response was forthcoming from Ankara,
Karabekir dryly notes that he repeated the cables on the
22nd, 23rd, and 26th, finally receiving answers on the 27th
of April.123
TBMM was officially convened for the first time on 23
April 1920.124 After the installation of Mustafa Kemal as
TBMM Chairman, Karabekir implies that his primary political
objectives were accomplished.125 However, the Bolshevik
issue was gaining momentum and importance. On 15 April 1920,
Karabekir circulated a declaration addressed to "everywhere,
including Istanbul" containing a synopsis of all available
information on prevailing conditions within Bolshevik
occupied territories and lands adjacent. The declaration
contained specific section headings on the Tatars, Kirghiz,
Bashkurt, Sart, Turkmen and Yomut126 as a part of the
overall analysis. In due course, Karabekir even mentions
Zeki Velidi [Togan] by name among leaders of the National
Liberation Movements in that region.127 Karabekir also
urged Mustafa Kemal, as Chairman of the TBMM, to broadcast a
Declaration on TBMM relations, expected or actual, with "the
servants of the Istanbul Government" as well as with the
Bolsheviks.128
On 26 April 1920, the response desired by Karabekir
arrived129. TBMM approved his plan that a military
delegation to be sent to Baku, and the contents of the
communication they were to carry. TBMM officially was asking
for money from the Moscow government.130 Karabekir added a
separate questionnaire to be answered by the Bolshevik side,
and a letter to the Turkish Communist Party in Baku. Before
the designated delegation could leave, the news of Red
Army's occupation of Baku on 28 April 1920 arrived. The
travelling route through Batum was now closed. A second
venue through Nakchevan was established and new letters had
to be written; they were sent on 5 May. The Istanbul
government was beginning to increase the pressure on the
civilian bureaucracy through fresh appointments from
Istanbul, to displace those Prefercts and Governors loyal to
TBMM. Apparently, not all of the Istanbul appointees
actually tried hard to take up their appointments within the
TBMM territories, but the TBMM was not at ease and
endeavored to counter all such initiatives. Karabekir also
suggested the publication of a foreign language newspaper
for distribution abroad.131 There were also the usual
frictions among colleagues and friends that take place
during highly-charged times.132
As a means of countering increasing propaganda from
Istanbul, TBMM sent a congratulatory cable to the recently
established Orenburg Government for distribution in the
"East," on 29 April 1920, along with a new Declaration of
the TBMM.133 The telegraphers, to whom the TBMM movement
owed an immense debt, founded the Association of
Professional Telegraphers in Defense of the Motherland, and
informed Karabekir. Acutely aware of their inestimable
contribution to the Independence Movement efforts, Karabekir
heartily congratulated the membership of this new society
(perhaps the first professional association in the TBMM era)
via an open letter published in the (probably the Albayrak
in Erzurum),134 local paper.135
On 2 May 1920, TBMM announced the establishment of its
standing executive committee, the Council of Ministers. The
monetary crisis in Ankara forced Mustafa Kemal on 3 May 1920
to ask Karabekir to request funds from the Azerbaijan
government.136 On 5 May, as noted above, not knowing how
the newly Bolshevik Azerbaijan government was going to
react, and having lost the Batum channel, Karabekir opened
another via Bayazit and Oltu. A new letter was sent to the
Turkish Communist Party in Baku. Simultaneously, Karabekir
wrote to TBMM, urging them not to delay the decision on
sending a Plenipotentiary to Moscow. Meanwhile, Peace
Conference deliberations were continually being discussed by
the daily media in Europe, drawing ever changing lines of
influence by various powers on the map.137 Istanbul
government was also assigning new Extraordinary Inspectors
for Asia Minor, but the appointees were rarely leaving
Istanbul. Also, attempts were being made to establish quasi-
military units loyal to the Istanbul government to fight the
TBMM forces. Fighting between the invading Bolshevik armies
and the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijan forces was
continuing while the TBMM borders in the East began to be
violated. There were disagreements between the TBMM
leadership and Karabekir as to how best to deal with these
conditions. Politics, internal and external, began to clash
with military strategy among the TBMM leadership, as the
Bolshevik armies proceeded bloodily to occupy Caucasian
territories. Karabekir continually circulated the latest
intelligence available on the developing conditions.138
On 25 May 1920, the TBMM Delegation to Moscow,
comprising Bekir Sami (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Yusuf
Kemal Bey (Minister of Economy), and three staff members,
arrived in Erzurum. On the 27th, Karabekir read the
instructions given to this Plenipotentiary Delegation, dated
8 May, and discussed its provisions with the Ministers.139
On 30 May 1920, Karabekir warned TBMM that San Remo
Conference140 was bankrupt, therefore armed struggle might
become the only available venue to assure independence.141
On 6 June 1920, in the face of approaching Bolshevik armies,
TBMM ordered Karabekir to reclaim Elviyei Selasiye (the
Ottoman administrative term for the territories lost to
tsarists during 1877 and 1914 campaigns), which were
restored to the Ottomans by the Brest-Litovsk treaty of 3
March 1918. Mobilization orders went out. On 15 June 1920,
the courier officer, Artillery Lieutenant Ibrahim Efendi
arrived from Moscow. This Lieutenant had conveyed the first
TBMM Declaration to Moscow, now was bringing a letter from
the Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin (dated 3 June
1920), addressed to the Chairman of TBMM. Upon reading the
letter, Karabekir concluded that Bolsheviks, too, wanted to
detach land from the TBMM. There were also letters from
Doctor Fuat Sabit Bey (now signing as the Representative of
the Baku Turk Communist Party), Bahaddin Sakir Bey, Ahmet
Cemal Pasha142 and Halil Pasha, who were all in Moscow.143
On 23 June 1920 Karabekir wrote to the Red Army Commander in
Baku, asking for facilitation of safe passage of the TBMM
Plenipotentiary Delegation.144
According to orders of TBMM, Karabekir's XV. Army Corps
began the re-possession maneuvers. Immediately afterwards, a
series of elliptical cables from Ankara told Karabekir to
pause and consider the Bolshevik proposal of establishing a
"Caucasus Federation." On 27 June 1920 the TBMM Delegation
left Erzurum for Moscow. Next day, another courier was sent
from Trabzon to Moscow, via Tuapse. Destitute refugees began
streaming into TBMM territories from the East, fleeing the
Bolsheviks of all types while the XV. Army Corps
reconnaissance patrols come under fire. During the night of
9/10 July, the TBMM Delegation finally left TBMM territories
aboard a motorboat, from Trabzon to Tuapse. They sent their
first wireless message from Moscow informing Karabekir of
their arrival on the 19th, by a special train sent to
collect them from Tuapse, which they boarded on the
12th.145 On 5 July 1920 Rawlinson volunteered to be
exchanged for the detainees in Malta. Karabekir passed the
message on to Ankara, and the proposal was eventually
carried out. It is interesting that Rawlinson, under house
arrest and surveillance, knew of the developments in
Istanbul.146
Karabekir notes that earlier he had sent a delegation
led by the Commander of the 12th Infantry Division, Lt. Col.
Resat Bey, to contact the Red Army. Information pertaining
to the troop movements of the Red Army being deployed in
Nakchevan now began arriving. This news was disturbing to
the civil population in Erzurum, who had no particular
affinity toward the Bolsheviks. Karabekir had to assure the
local civilian leadership that TBMM had no intention of
becoming Bolshevik, but had to establish contact with them
and even seek their material help. The officers thus sent
from the XV. Army Corps removed their Ottoman style gold
braid epaulets, sensitive to the hostility of the Bolshevik
side to such decorations. Karabekir immediately redesigned
the entire slate of rank insignia for the XV. Army Corps, to
prevent both Bolshevik contamination and confusion with the
old Ottoman army, and informed Ankara.
On 27 July 1920, two officers arrived from Northern
Caucasus and provided a report.147 Despite the written
guarantees given to the Northern Caucasus populations by the
Bolsheviks, those promises were not being kept. On 2 August
1920, Prefect of Zor, comrade Salih Zeki (in the company of
comrade Nureddin) visited Karabekir at his field
Headquarters. The two comrades made a case for a Bolshevik
TBMM, asserted the existence of Bolshevik organizations in
Asia Minor. They planned to visit Ankara to argue their
position. Despite Karabekir's best efforts, Bolshevik
propaganda was taking root, even in Erzurum, which centered
around the proposed establishment of various "peoples
governments."148 On 3 August, Karabekir issued an order to
his officers, forbidding low level contacts with the Baku
Turkish Communist Party officials. On the 4th, Karabekir
circulated a more comprehensive declaration to his entire
command, with detailed information on the political and
military conditions. Mustafa Subhi asked and obtained
permission to visit TBMM in Ankara.149
On 5 August 1920, a telephone message arrived from
Halil Pasha, indicating the shipment from Moscow to Ankara
of 500kg of gold in six crates, a complete wireless
telegraph station capable of instituting direct
communications between Moscow and Ankara. In addition, two
"Muslim Staff Officers" of the Red Army and the First
Secretary of the Bolshevik Embassy to Ankara were
accompanying Halil Pasha. Signing as "Comrade Halil," he
further indicated the planned shipment of munitions. On 7
August, General Staff of the Red Army provided order of
battle information to Karabekir. "Comrade Halil" supplied
political intelligence on 8 August, the contents of which
were passed on to TBMM.150
Karabekir notes that a delegation was requested from
his region, to attend the Bolshevik Congress in Baku.151
Karabekir added two of his officers to the group, to observe
the conditions. Some of the participating civilians were
apprehensive. Karabekir lectured the delegation, assuring
them the TBMM leadership intention was not to adoption of
Bolshevism, however it had to be taken into account and
studied. Thus it was their duty to learn, not to be caught
unawares. Another cypher from "Comrade Halil" indicated a
larger sum of gold was scheduled to arrive in the company of
the Bolshevik Ambassador. There was also another letter from
Cemal Pasha to Mustafa Kemal.152 On 15 August 1920, another
courier officer, Lieutenant Serif Efendi, arrived from Baku.
He had had interviews with the 11th Red Army Commander
Levandovksi on 9 July 1920, Ordjonikidze on 17 July 1920,
the Azerbaijan War Commissar Ali Haydar Karayev, Head of the
Turkish Social Democrat Organization [sic] Mustafa Subhi,
and Turkistan Deputy Minister of War, Emirhanov.
On 27 August 1920, the Embassy of the Soviet government
arrived in Karakose, in the company of Halil Pasha.153 On 3
September 1920. TBMM Chief of Staff Ismet Bey informed the
XV. Army Corps that TBMM was considering a move to Sivas due
to the Western Front [i. e. Greek Armies] moving closer East
and its anticipated effects on Ankara. Karabekir disagreed,
regarding such a move as a display of weakness.154 On the
same day, another cable from TBMM General Staff, signed by
Ismet Bey stated "The arriving Russian delegation exhibits
the signs of an intelligence and administrative control
organ charged with the duty of organizing the country for
revolution, rather than a Diplomatic Embassy. It is
unacceptable and unexplainable that they have left telegraph
equipment and personnel in Bayazit....The English and
Germans had acted similarly, established direct and
independent communication links [with their superiors] upon
setting foot in our country....It is apparent from the 2
September 1920 decision of the Heyeti Vekile (Executive
Committee, or, the Cabinet of the TBMM) there is a movement
to effect a communist revolution, enslave and turn the
country over to the Bolshevik objectives...."155
On the same day another courier officer [Kamil Efendi]
arrived from Moscow. He reported having been thoroughly
examined in Tuapse by the Russians, the nature of whose
questions betrayed the intentions and thoughts of his
interrogators. This officer's cyphers [implied to be sent
from Tuapse] required four days to reach the TBMM
Plenipotentiary in Moscow. He was later confronted by an
individual named Mustafa Nafi, who earlier held privileges
in Istanbul,156 claiming to be a true communist, "unlike
Mustafa Subhi." He now carried a map on which the Bolshevik
flag was depicted over Istanbul, and expressed his wish to
plant the communist flag on St. Sophia personally. He
further asserted he was a Turkish language instructor at the
Red Army Communist Staff and Command School. Kamil Efendi
observed the presence in Moscow literally hundreds of
individuals claiming to represent "Turkiye." The courier
officer also learned that the guards posted in front of the
building to which the TBMM Plenipotentiary Delegation was
assigned were ordered not to reveal anyone the identities or
affiliations of the individuals staying in the building. No
one was to see the TBMM Delegation except by special permit.
Enver Pasha arrived in Moscow, held talks with Lenin, and
Lt. Kamil Efendi secured an audience with Enver Pasha [who
also met with the TBMM Plenipotentiary Delegation in
Moscow], who spoke at length of saving the "country." Kamil
Efendi's final comments pertained to the extreme scarcity of
food in Moscow, and the meagerness of the rations provided
even to the Plenipotentiary Delegation, which consisted of a
loaf of bread, tea, "cabbage soup" and corn gruel.157
After reading this report, Karabekir wrote a letter to
Enver Pasha and sent it via a courier officer, reminding him
of their earlier friendship, asking him to refrain from
adventurism under any guise.158 Karabekir adds a personal
observation: "Every individual, especially those holding
responsible positions, ought to consider the nature and
origin of all ideas prior to acting on them. Otherwise they
should know they will cause harm to their nations."159
On 7 September 1920 the Bolshevik Embassy Delegation
was invited to the plays staged by the War Orphans cared for
by the XV. Army Corps. Among the Delegation members were the
First Secretary Opmal and the Military Attache Bakirof, who
is reported by Karabekir to be a Turk. Opmal asserted the
need for the Turkish Communist Party to act openly and
freely to convince Moscow that TBMM is actively anti-
imperialist. By means of examples, Opmal painted a picture
of government-owned means of production and command economy.
Simultaneously, Bolshevik propaganda began its assault on
the XV. Army Corps personnel.160 Next day, the shipment of
gold arriving from Moscow reached Erzurum, where 200kg of
which was retained by the XV. Army Corps. The remainder was
forwarded to Ankara.
On 20 September 1920, Mustafa Kemal instructed
Karabekir to establish contact with the Georgians, and begin
reclaiming the territories lost to the Russians during 1877
and again in 1914. Having prepared for the occasion
previously, Karabekir moved his headquarters out of Erzurum.
Domestic intrigues once again required immediate attention,
in this instance, in Erzurum itself. Karabekir had to rush
back and investigate. This time it proved to be an easily
soluble problem. After a series of personnel reassignments,
Karabekir invited the 3rd Division (Trabzon) Commander Col.
Rst Bey to become the Acting Commander, XV. Army Corps,
while he himself was Commanding the Eastern Front. Karabekir
asked Col. Rst Bey to transport the one million gold
rubles brought from Moscow by Lieutenant Ibrahim Efendi,
from Trabzon to Erzurum. On 7 October, Karabekir returned to
his field headquarters at the front. On 30 October,
Karabekir entered Kars and found there an officer reporting
to Admiral Bristol.161 On 3 November 1920 the Bolshevik
Plenipotentiary [a Georgian, later Ambassador to TBMM]
Mdivani162, indicating he has received a cable from the
Commissar of Foreign Affairs, asked Karabekir whether the
Mutual Friendship Treaty arrived, and when the Bolshevik
side could expect a TBMM Delegation. In response, Karabekir
cabled that Treaty had been received. Yusuf Kemal Bey had
returned to Ankara and information on the Delegation would
be forwarded. On 21 November 1920 TBMM Acting Foreign
Minister Ahmet Muhtar163 wrote to Karabekir, asking him to
establish contact with the TBMM Plenipotentiary Bekir Sami
Bey in Moscow to determine if Bekir Sami was in receipt of
the telegrams sent from Ankara. On 16 November [sic], Bekir
Sami Bey arrived in Kars from Baku.164 Four days later
General Ali Fuat and Staff Officer Major Saffet Bey reached Kars.
They were appointed by TBMM Ambassador and Military
Attache, respectively, to Moscow.165
On 11 December, the Turkish communists Mustafa Subhi
and Ethem Nejat paid a visit to Karabekir. They outlined
their plan to travel to Ankara with their retinue, via
Tbilisi [sic], because they feared a plot against their
lives in Erzurum [sic]. Karabekir suggested they journey via
Erzurum to Ankara, because gossip to the effect they were
going to conduct Bolshevik propaganda had begun. They agreed
and left altogether. They did not arrive at their proposed
destination.166
On 16 December, the TBMM Embassy Delegation left for
Moscow167 by train via Kars, Tbilisi and Baku, after
conferring with Karabekir on the 15th.168 On 22 December
1920, Mdivani, the Bolshevik Ambassador left by train for
Ankara via Erzurum. Karabekir observed that, during his 24
days in Kars, Mdivani worked to establish secret Bolshevik
organizations in the vicinity, including and especially in
the Malakite villages, and managed the affairs of the
Mustafa Subhi group.
On 2 February 1921, Mrs. Hertz, working in an American
Relief institution in Kars, visited Karabekir.169 She
reported that Admiral Bristol had requested, by letter, she
learn the actual conditions on the ground from an
authoritative source. Mrs. Hertz asked Karabekir if he could
relay her letter to Admiral Bristol. Karabekir agreed, but
personally censored the information pertaining to his own
troop strength (by way of cutting the component Division
identification numbers of the XV. Army Corps out of the
letter handed him unsealed).170 On 16 February, TBMM
Tbilisi Representative Kazim Bey sent a long cypher to
Karabekir concerning the fighting between the Georgians,
Armenians and Russians, while the Georgian General Staff
informed Karabekir of their own conditions and plans.
Karabekir observed that this still was the continuation of
earlier Bolshevik efforts to draw the XV. Army Corps to the
East, and have the TBMM participate in a "Caucasian
Confederation." The primary aim of the related invitation
was to involve the TBMM forces under Karabekir's command in
the ongoing fighting, to cause attrition, to reduce its
fighting capacity and morale. That, in turn, the Bolsheviks
hoped, would make the TBMM leadership more malleable to the
Bolshevik demands.171 The "lure" used by the Bolsheviks, of
course, was that TBMM was going to "acquire more land."
Perhaps the Bolsheviks chose to ignore the "National Pact"
drawn at the Erzurum Congress delineating the TBMM National
Borders, which did not include Caucasia but stopped at
"Elviyei Selasiye."172 It appears that the value of the XV.
Corps, as a unit, was even higher by simply remaining
stationary. However, the officers and the Staff of the XV.
Corps were by no means idle. Karabekir warned the
appropriate authorities in Karakilise and Yerevan that he
wished to receive reports directly from his Liaison
Officers, Tevfik Efendi and Captain Bahattin Efendi,
respectively.173 The reports arrived.
Three Liaison Officers from the Red Army arrived in
Karabekir's headquarters on 1 March 1921, "bringing the
regards of the Red Army to the XV. Army Corps." On 9 March,
Karabekir received an urgent order from Ankara to occupy
Batum and environs. The same day, Keker, the Red Army
Commander in Tbilisi, sent his congratulations to Karabekir
on the occasion! It appeared that the TBMM Foreign Ministry
and the General Staff had not coordinated their actions,
leaving Karabekir to sort out the tangled affairs related to
the occupation of Batum by TBMM troops. A long cyphered
cable flowed from Karabekir to the General Staff.174 With
the Menshevik Georgians leaving Batum, the Mdivani brothers'
era in Ankara came to an end. On 18 March 1921, Orjonikidze
wrote to Karabekir, asking him to evacuate Batum. Two days
later the TBMM Delegation in Moscow sent a cypher announcing
the signing of the Friendship Treaty. Karabekir ordered his
troops be withdrawn from Batum. The border between the TBMM
and the Bolsheviks was taking shape.
On 21 March 1921, a letter from Col. Ibrahim Tali
[during the First World War, Commander of Karabekir's
Medical units] arrived.175 On 27 March 1921, TBMM ratified
the Moscow Treaty.176 The TBMM designation as an
appellation was taking a firm hold.
Keker, Commander of the 11th Red Army in Caucasus,
requested a meeting with Karabekir. They agreed to meet in
Gmr. Keker turned out to be 34 years of age, Russian,
nervous, and a chain smoker. He was in the continuous and
ever present company of two Commissars, a Russian and a
Georgian. Karabekir notes that Keker was especially
resentful of the Russian Commissar. Keker also insistently
requested that Karabekir evacuate Gmr, not always
successfully veiling his implied threats.177 Karabekir
agreed to contact Ankara for permission. Before a response
was received from Ankara, Keker cabled, using crass
language, setting deadlines. Karabekir was also aware of
Chicherin's harsh words to the TBMM Ambassador Ali Fuat
[Cebesoy]. Furthermore, on 21 April 1921 Bolsheviks forcibly
entered the TBMM Embassy facilities in Moscow, ransacking
office files, beating embassy personnel.178 Therefore,
Karabekir ordered his units to go on alert. Finally, TBMM
ordered Karabekir to evacuate the region in one week.
Karabekir informed Keker, relaying his regrets for Keker's
foul words. On 29 April 1921, Yusuf Kemal Bey, a member of
the TBMM Plenipotentiary Delegation arrived in Kars from
Moscow, in the company of four million gold rubles, on his
way to Ankara.
Karabekir began to redirect his attention to the
detention of spies and provocateurs in his territory. Once
again refugees began to pour into TBMM lands, this time from
Armenia, where fighting between various factions of
Armenians, Georgians and Russians was continuing. Bolshevik
propaganda was also reaching a crescendo. The Ankara
government established a new department to enlighten the
population and counter Bolshevik efforts. Enver and other
CUP leaders were also beginning to make plans to return and
play a role in the TBMM movement. Dr. Riza Nur179 sent
voluminous reports and analyses on the political conditions,
with which Karabekir disagreed on the basis of his own
intelligence information.180 A copy of the Bolshevik
Ambassador Mdivani's briefing to the Revkom (Revolutionary
Committee) also arrived. Karabekir did not place much import
on this text, skeptical of its authenticity since it was
purchased from the Menshevik Georgians by Hsamettin Bey,
the TBMM Tbilisi Representative. Nonetheless he recorded the
text, in which Mdivani suggested "...dictating Bolshevik
objectives to the peoples of the East via the control of the
TBMM mechanism....therefore no sacrifice is too great on the
part of Moscow to realize this plan..."181
Conditions in the Eastern territories of the TBMM were
gradually being transformed from war-time military
operations into peace-time politics. New Societies of all
types were being organized daily. Karabekir hinted at his
desire to become the Civilian Governor General of the
territory, devastated in terms of economics and
infrastructure, to continue to serve in the region which he
came to love. TBMM was reluctant, at least silent on the
matter. Fighting on the Western Front was reaching a climax.
Karabekir began transferring munitions and troops to the
Western Front, wher they were to play crucial role in later
fighting.
On 20 September 1921, a Bolshevik Delegation brought the ratified Moscow [friendship] Treaty to Kars, which was greeted with military honors. The ratified TBMM copy was also at hand, having been sent from Ankara. On 22 September, copies were exchanged with due ceremonies. Now, the Ankara government directed Karabekir to sign the Kars Treaty as the Lead TBMM Plenipotentiary. On 26 September 1921 the Bolshevik Plenipotentiary Delegation charged to participate in the Kars Treaty arrived. The work of the Conference lasted until 10 October 1921 when the Kars Treaty was signed. Recovery of the lands lost to tsarists in 1877 and 1914 was completed by Karabekir and the TBMM-Bolshevik border formally recognized.182 The Turkish War of Independence formally continued until the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. The British troops, the last of the occupying forces, saluted the Turkish flag and evacuated Istanbul on 2 October 1923.
AFTERWORD
The Russians seemed content with the Kars Treaty and
the related arrangements until the Second World War. The day
after the 1945 San Francisco Treaty was signed by some fifty
states (the founding document for the United Nations),183
including the Turkish Republic and the USSR, the USSR
demanded land from the Turkish Republic, precisely in the
same region covered by the Kars Treaty.184 The Soviet
demands finally prompted the Truman Doctrine, a military aid
program to the Turkish Republic and Greece proposed to the
U. S. Congress on 12 March 1947. Military Aid and
Cooperation agreement between the Turkish Republic and the
U. S. was ratified by the Ankara government on 1 September
1947, which is still in force as amended --apart from a
multitude of additional secret protocols over time-- but
suspended for a period beginning in 1975 over the dispute
regarding joint treaty obligations concerning Cyprus.
Turkish Republic was also a beneficiary of the Marshall
Plan. When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk died at the age of 57
during 1938, Ismet Inonu became the Turkish President.185
The full rapprochement of the Turkish Republic with the
British, French and the Italians came with the onset of the
Second World War, when the Allies sought to involve the
Turkish Republic against Germany. Inonu kept the Turkish
Republic out of the World War186 and remained in office
until his Republican People's Party (CHP) was voted out in
1950.
As a Charter Member of the U. N., the Turkish Republic sent troops to join the U. N. Command in Korea from June 1950 and her admission into NATO followed on 18 February 1952. Turkish membership in the U. S. led CENTO and RCD treaties rounded out the political and strategic agreements in the region, in line with the U. S. "Containment Policy" aimed at the Soviet Union. Ismet Inonu was the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic, to whom President Johnson wrote his Letter of 5 June 1964, related to the Cyprus issue.187 That event was also a turning point in the Turkish Republic and USSR economic and diplomatic relations. Accounts of the circumstances encompassing the terrorism waves in the Turkish Republic during the 1970s, its external origins, sources and economic implications, began to emerge on the heels of the 1980 military coup, the third in as many decades.188
Continued with the
NOTES
